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“We were wanderers from the beginning.”
- Carl Sagan
Exploration is in our nature. Throughout human history, migration has been
vital to our survival, and continues to be central to our political discussions and
economic fortunes. This dissertation contributes to an understanding of the ef-
fects of migration on welfare and taxation.
In chapter 1, I examine the welfare effects of immigration on United States
workers. I build a dynamic search and matching model in which immigrants and
natives differ according to their outside options, separation rates, wealth holdings
and skill composition. Immigration affects native-born welfare by i) altering the
skill composition of the labor force, ii) lowering the expected hiring cost of firms,
and iii) altering the rate of return on wealth. I demonstrate that the transition
period, during which the economy adjusts to immigration, involves both higher
returns to wealth and inferior labor market conditions in comparison to the long
run steady state. Accounting for transition dynamics therefore shifts the welfare
effects of immigration in favor of wealthy households at the expense of workers.
In chapter 2, I shift the discussion from the movement of labor across national
boundaries to the internal movement of labor from rural to urban locations. I an-
alyze the welfare effects of a policy of modern sector enlargement (MSENL), and
a policy of increasing the efficiency of on-the-job search from the urban informal
sector (IEOS) in a generalized Harris-Todaro model. I show that MSENL causes a
Lorenz worsening of the income distribution and IEOS causes a Lorenz improve-
ment. In a rare direct application of the Atkinson theorem, I conclude that MSENL
decreases social welfare and IEOS increases social welfare for all anonymous, in-
creasing and Schur-concave social welfare functions.
In chapter 3, I return to international migration by investigating its effect on
the ability of governments to raise tax revenue. I construct Laffer curves using
a static two country neoclassical model with international labor mobility. I show
that international migration i) shifts the peak of the Laffer curve to the left, and ii)
is quantitatively more important than the labor supply elasticity in determining
the shape and position of the Laffer curve. A simple calibration reveals that almost
every country in the EU-14 is currently located on the “slippery slope” portion of
both the labor tax and capital tax Laffer curves.
In chapter 4, I depart from the theme of migration while retaining the focus on
the tax system. Kyle Rozema and I analyze the effect of tax expenditures on the
stabilizing power of the tax system. We propose a microsimulation strategy which
exploits links that we identify between automatic stabilizers, tax expenditures,
and effective marginal tax rates. Using the Survey of Consumer Finances from
1988 to 2009, we estimate that, on average, the Mortgage Interest Deduction and
the Charitable Contributions Deduction increased the sensitivity of consumption
to income fluctuations from a baseline of 0.14 by 1.13% and 0.97%, respectively.
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CHAPTER 1
THE DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION
1.1 Introduction
Restrictions on labor movements between countries are arguably the largest pol-
icy distortions in the international economy. Wage differentials for observably
identical workers can exceed 1000% across different national markets (Clemens
et al., 2008), compared to price wedges that rarely exceed 74% for goods, and 15%
for financial instruments (Clemens, 2011). Estimates of the increase in world GDP
caused by the removal of labor market barriers range from 66% (Iregui, 2005) to
127% (Klein and Ventura, 2007) - three orders of magnitude larger than the equiv-
alent removal of trade or capital flow barriers.
Despite these enormous potential gains to world income, and a dramatic ex-
pansion in international migration over the last 20 years, more than 96% of hu-
manity remain in their country of birth (International Organization for Migration,
2013). Host countries continue to restrict inward migrant entry out of public con-
cern for the adverse effect of immigration on the welfare of native-born citizens
(Mayda, 2006).1 Understanding these welfare consequences is therefore not just
important to native-born workers, but also to the substantial proportion of the
world population who wish to migrate.
In this article, I examine the impact of immigration on the labor market out-
comes, wealth holdings, and welfare of native-born workers in a dynamic model
1For example, 47% of Americans and 64% of Britons viewed migration as more of a problem
than an opportunity in 2013 (Transatlantic Trends, 2013, p. 14).
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with labor market search frictions (Diamond, 1982; Mortensen and Pissarides,
1994) and endogenous wealth accumulation. Migrants and natives differ accord-
ing to their outside options (Chassamboulli and Palivos, 2014), separation rates
(Battisti et al., 2014), skill composition (Borjas, 2003) and wealth holdings.
Within this theoretical framework, immigration affects native welfare via three
primary channels - the price channel, the hiring cost channel, and the capital surplus
channel. The price channel reflects standard classical factor demand theory. Im-
migration alters the skill composition of the labor force and the resulting factor
returns which, in a competitive setting, affects wages. I demonstrate that this im-
pact on wages is maintained in my non-Walrasian labor market setup, and that
the changes in relative productivities also alter the hiring incentives of firms and
therefore employment.
The hiring cost channel is novel to the immigration literature (Chassamboulli
and Palivos, 2013). Immigrants have lower outside options than their native coun-
terparts and are therefore willing to accept lower wages. Because firms cannot ex-
ante distinguish between native and immigrant workers when posting job vacan-
cies, immigration increases the likelihood that a given vacancy is eventually filled
by an immigrant, and therefore decreases the expected wage to be paid by a firm.
The resulting increase in firm surplus promotes hiring activity, which improves
the labor market conditions of both immigrants and the native-born through an
increase in employment and the bargaining positions of workers.
The capital surplus channel is related to the concept of the “immigration sur-
plus” identified by Borjas (1995). In the absence of a perfectly elastic capital stock,
immigration temporarily generates higher rates of return to capital while lower-
ing the average marginal product of labor, thereby benefiting the owners of capital
2
at the expense of workers.2
To my knowledge, this article is the first to simultaneously consider each of
these three channels within the same model. Ben-Gad (2004) and Moy and Yip
(2006) employ neoclassical growth frameworks with homogeneous labor to in-
vestigate the capital surplus channel. Ben-Gad (2008) extends Ben-Gad (2004) by
incorporating skill heterogeneity to further examine the redistributive price chan-
nel across skill groups. More recently, Chassamboulli and Palivos (2013, 2014)
and Battisti et al. (2014) examined the effects of immigration within a search and
matching framework with skill heterogeneity. These studies incorporate the price
and hiring cost channels but do not speak to the capital surplus channel.
In order to accommodate the capital surplus channel, I compute the full tran-
sition dynamics of the economy as it adjusts to new levels of immigration. While
Ben-Gad (2008) accounts for transition dynamics in a neoclassical framework,
this article is the first to do so in a setting with labor market frictions. The lit-
erature traditionally derives welfare implications by comparing pre- and post-
migration steady states within static frameworks (Borjas, 1995, 1999) or by ignor-
ing transition dynamics within dynamic frameworks (Liu, 2010; Chassamboulli
and Palivos, 2013, 2014; Battisti et al., 2014). There are two issues with this ap-
proach. The first is that the transition to the new steady state can involve peri-
ods in which wages, unemployment, and returns on wealth deviate substantially
from their eventual steady state values. Failing to account for these deviations
potentially ignores significant fluctuations in income that could alter welfare con-
clusions based solely on steady state values. The second issue is that the result-
2Borjas (1999) estimates that this channel redistributes approximately 2% of output from work-
ers to owners of capital within a static model, although Ben-Gad (2004) demonstrates that account-
ing for transition dynamics reduces this estimate by a factor of three.
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ing steady state levels of asset holdings, and therefore consumption, inherently
depend on the transition dynamics in an economy with heterogeneous wealth
holders (Mendoza and Tesar, 1998). The literature therefore necessarily makes
simplifying assumptions such as not allowing immigrants to accumulate wealth
(Palivos, 2009; Liu, 2010) or forcing savings to be sent abroad (Moy and Yip, 2006).
These assumptions completely eliminate the redistributive effect of the capital sur-
plus channel.
The transition dynamics, and therefore the relevance of the capital surplus chan-
nel, crucially depend on the elasticity of the aggregate capital stock. I therefore
investigate the welfare consequences of immigration under two extreme scenar-
ios - an open economy in which domestic asset markets are fully open to foreign
capital flows and a closed economy in which the aggregate capital stock is fully
determined by the wealth accumulation decisions of domestic households. The
dynamics of the closed economy are more protracted than the open economy dy-
namics because the aggregate capital stock in a closed economy is less reactive
to the changes in factor prices caused by immigration. The marginal productiv-
ities of labor, which are increasing in the level of the capital stock, are therefore
lower during the closed economy transition than the open economy transition. As
a result, the closed economy creates inferior labor market outcomes - in the form
of lower wages and higher unemployment - in comparison to the open economy
over the adjustment period. Offsetting these negative labor market effects are the
increased rates of return to capital that occur in the closed economy over the adjust-
ment period. In other words, the capital surplus channel plays a more important
role in the closed economy.
An additional contribution of this article is a methodological one. I adopt the
4
preference specification of Greenwood et al. (1988) which ensures that the disu-
tility derived from employment is independent of household wealth. This allows
the coefficient on the disutility of labor to be consistent with the interpretation of
an “outside option” that is common in the search and matching literature with risk
neutral agents. To my knowledge, I am the first to exploit this particular impli-
cation of these preferences within a search and matching model with risk averse
agents. The assumption facilitates both the steady state and transition analysis by
allowing labor market dynamics, which would otherwise depend on household
wealth (Krusell et al., 2010), to be computed separately from wealth dynamics.
I calibrate the model to match key features of the United States economy over
the previous decade, including unemployment rates, wage premiums, wealth
holdings, population shares and job finding rates for each worker type using data
from the Current Population Survey and the Survey of Income and Program Par-
ticipation. I simulate the effects of immigration by increasing the size of the labor
force by 1% through an increase in the stock of either high skill or low skill immi-
grants. I do not model the migration decision itself, and instead assume that the
number of migrants can be completely determined by policy - a realistic assump-
tion for the United States.
Consistent with Chassamboulli and Palivos (2013), my baseline calibration im-
plies that the price channel dominates the hiring cost channel in the determination
of long run wages. An influx of low (high) skill migrants equal to 1% of the labor
force reduces the long run wages of low (high) skill workers by 0.27% (0.91%). The
same influx of low (high) skill migrants also increases the long run wages of high
(low) skill workers by 0.45% (0.67%). These figures can be interpreted as long run
wage elasticities and are roughly consistent with the estimates of between -0.3 and
5
-0.4 in frameworks with competitive labor markets (Borjas, 2003; Ben-Gad, 2008),
as well as the empirical literature.
My baseline calibration also implies that steady state employment outcomes
are instead driven by the hiring cost channel, which is again consistent with Chas-
samboulli and Palivos (2013). Immigration reduces unemployment for all work-
ers, regardless of skill type. Specifically, an influx of low skill migrants equal to 1%
of the labor force reduces the long run unemployment of low (high) skill workers
by 0.30% (0.21%). Similarly, the same influx of high skill workers reduces the long
run unemployment of low (high) skill workers by 0.29% (0.04%). These findings
are also consistent with the meta analysis on the impact of immigration on em-
ployment conducted by Longhi et al. (2006), who show that there appears to be a
small net job creation effect in the United States.
Low (high) skill immigration always improves the welfare of high (low) skill
workers and reduces welfare for low (high) skill workers, both in the long run and
after accounting for transition dynamics. The magnitude of the welfare changes,
however, crucially depend on the elasticity of the aggregate capital stock. That
is, it depends on the strength of the capital surplus channel. In the open economy,
the perfectly elastic aggregate capital stock maintains a constant return to wealth
while ensuring relatively high average returns to labor. On the other hand, the
closed economy with a more sluggish aggregate capital stock ensures that returns
to wealth remain higher at the expense of lower marginal products of labor. There-
fore, a household’s preference over the elasticity of the aggregate capital stock de-
pends on the relative contributions of labor income and capital income to total
household income.
I find that the wealthier high skill households prefer the closed economy set-
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ting because the baseline calibration implies that the increase in asset returns more
than compensates for the relative decline in labor market conditions in compar-
ison to the open economy setting. Low skill immigration induces a welfare gain
equal to 0.3% of initial consumption in the closed economy compared to just 0.17%
in the open economy. Similarly, high skill immigration reduces welfare by an
equivalent of 0.38% of initial consumption compared to 0.55% in the open econ-
omy.
On the other hand, for the less wealthy low skill households, the improve-
ment in asset returns provided by the closed economy does not compensate for the
worsened and more protracted labor market conditions. High skill immigration
induces a welfare gain equal to 0.67% of initial consumption in the open economy
compared to just 0.50% in the closed economy. Similarly, low skill immigration re-
duces welfare by an equivalent of 0.24% of initial consumption compared to 0.12%
in the open economy.
Finally, a word on the difference between the reported welfare gains above,
which are calculated at impact, and long run welfare gains, which are calculated
once the economy has adjusted to its long run steady state. In the open economy,
the perfectly elastic aggregate capital stock ensures that long run welfare coincides
with the welfare change experienced on impact. In the closed economy, however,
the transition to the new steady state is costly in the sense that long run welfare is
higher than welfare on impact. This is because the temporary increase in returns
to wealth incentivizes households to delay consumption, thereby allowing the ac-
cumulation of a higher level of long run wealth, which is reflected in higher long
run consumption given that the long run labor market conditions are equivalent
in both cases. Long run welfare therefore always dominates the measure of wel-
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fare on impact which accounts for the transition dynamics in a closed economy.
When evaluating a potential immigration policy, however, policy makers ought
to be concerned with the total change in welfare. Nevertheless the relative signs
and magnitudes are unaffected.
This article is related to a vast empirical literature that examines the impact of
immigration on the labor market outcomes of the host country by either exploit-
ing variation in immigration stocks across local labor markets (Altonji and Card,
1991; Pischke and Velling, 1997), national level labor supply variation across edu-
cation and experience groups (Grossman, 1982; Borjas, 2003), or natural immigra-
tion experiments (Card, 1990; Hunt, 1992). Unfortunately, a consistent conclusion
still evades the profession. For example, Borjas (2003) and Borjas et al. (2008) find
a large negative wage effect of immigration on natives, whereas Card (2009) and
Ottaviano and Peri (2012) find a small and often positive effect. I build on a more
recent related literature that seeks to answer this question within a general equi-
librium framework (Ben-Gad, 2004, 2008; Liu, 2010; Chassamboulli and Palivos,
2013, 2014).
This article proceeds as follows. In section 1.2, I describe the theoretical model.
In section 1.3, I describe the calibration procedure and the data sources used to
inform the calibration. In section 1.4, I analyze the mechanisms through which
migrants impact the labor market, wealth holdings, and native welfare. I present
the results of the calibrated quantitative model in section 1.5. I conclude in section
1.6.
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1.2 Model
There are four types of representative households, each consisting of a continuum
of workers of the same type. Workers are either native-born (N) or immigrants (I)
and each worker has either high (H) or low (L) skill. Members of each household
pool their income in order to insure each other against individual employment
risks. Consumption and investment decisions are therefore made at the level of
the household. I denote the measure of type i j workers as Qi j, where i ∈ {H, L}
denotes the skill level and j ∈ {N, I} distinguishes native from immigrant workers.
I normalize the total measure of workers to unity,
∑
i j Qi j = 1. Immigration is
modeled as an exogenous increase in the total measure of workers through an
increase in either QHI or QLI . Time is discrete. All decisions are dynamic and
time subscripts are omitted for notational clarity. Where appropriate, recursive
notation is used to distinguish contemporary from future variables.
Production The final output numeraire good Y is produced by a representative
firm using capital K and a composite input Z according to the following produc-
tion function
Y = AKαZ1−α (1.1)
where A is total factor productivity, α is the capital share of output and Z is a CES
aggregate of different types of intermediate goods. The Cobb-Douglas functional
form in (1.1) implicitly assumes that physical capital has the same degree of sub-
stitutability with each type of labor contained in Z. This structure coincides with
the majority of the literature (Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Battisti et al.,
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2014).3
The composite input good Z is produced using an intermediate low-skilled
good YL and an intermediate high-skilled good YH defined by
Z =
(
γYρL + (1 − γ)YρH
)1/ρ
where −∞ < ρ ≤ 1 is a function of the elasticity of substitution σHL between the
two skill groups (ρ = 1 − 1/σHL) and γ is a productivity parameter that deter-
mines the income share of the low-skilled good (Card and Lemieux, 2001). The
breakdown of skill types is not an innocuous assumption. Different aggregation
levels of education imply vastly different wage elasticities in the empirical litera-
ture, and as (Borjas, 2014, p. 127) states, “there is no convincing evidence on how
best to pool” the intermediate goods in this setup. Nevertheless, the recognition
that migration differentially impacts different skill groups is a key feature of the
empirical literature and the dual decomposition should be viewed as a minimalist
assumption.4
The representative firm rents capital from workers and purchases the interme-
diate goods from perfectly competitive firms that produce using linear functions
of labor according to the following production functions
Yi = EiN + EiI , i ∈ {L,H} (1.2)
where Ei j is the measure of employed workers of type i j.
3There are, however, a number of empirical studies that find that physical capital is more com-
plementary toward high skill labor than toward low skill labor (Griliches, 1969; Berndt and Chris-
tensen, 1974; Denny and Fuss, 1977; Krusell et al., 2000). Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014) utilize
these observations in order to simulate a larger immigration surplus from high skill immigration
than from low skill immigration.
4This structure is identical to that used in Battisti et al. (2014) and similar to the structure used in
Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014). Dustmann et al. (2013) avoid the aggregation issue altogether
by assessing the impact of immigration along the entire wage distribution.
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Embedded within Equation (1.2) is the implicit assumption that native-born
and immigrant workers within each skill-level are perfect substitutes. Much of the
disagreement in the empirical literature on the effect of migration on wages can
be reduced to a disagreement regarding the degree to which migrants and natives
of a given skill level are substitutable in production.5 For example, Borjas et al.
(2008) and Aydemir and Borjas (2007) estimate an effectively infinite elasticity and
conclude that equally skilled natives and immigrants are perfect substitutes in
their findings of a negative effect of migration on wages. The positive wage effects
in Ottaviano and Peri (2012), on the other hand, are a result of their empirical
findings that natives and immigrants are not perfect substitutes in production
even within a skill group. However, Borjas et al. (2012) go on to show that the
elasticity of substitution of around 20 estimated by Ottaviano and Peri (2012) was
a result of an unusual regression specification which, once corrected, results in an
elasticity close to infinity. I side with Borjas et al. (2012) and, indeed, with Battisti
et al. (2014) in assuming that natives and migrants are perfect substitutes.
The intermediate goods market is perfectly competitive so prices pi reflect their
marginal contribution to the production of the final good. In particular,
pL = AKα(1 − α)γYρ−1L
[
γYρL + (1 − γ)YρH
](1−α−ρ)/ρ
(1.3)
pH = AKα(1 − α)(1 − γ)Yρ−1H
[
γYρL + (1 − γ)YρH
](1−α−ρ)/ρ
(1.4)
Because the labor market is not competitive, the equilibrium prices of the inter-
mediate goods are not equal to wages. This creates total non-zero profits for the
representative intermediate goods firm of
d = pHYH + pLYL − ELNwLN − ELIwLI − EHNwHN − EHIwHI − κLvL − κHvH (1.5)
5See Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Borjas (2014) for a discussion.
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where wi j is the wage paid to worker type i j, κi is the cost of posting a vacancy
to labor market i and vi is the total number of vacancies posted to labor market
i.6 Profits are paid out as dividends to households, who are the shareholders, as
explained below.
Finally, the representative final good firm rents capital on competitive markets
at a price that reflects its marginal product
r = αA
( Z
K
)1−α
(1.6)
Labor Markets There is a separate labor market for each skill type (H and L).
Intermediate-good firms post skill-specific vacancies which do not distinguish be-
tween natives and immigrants, as usually required by law. The supply of each
type of worker is given exogenously and natives and immigrants of the same
skill-type compete for the same jobs. Four types of workers therefore compete
in just two labor markets. The total supply of workers in labor market i is given
by Qi = QiN + QiI , i ∈ {H, L}. Immigration represents an exogenous change in the
number of foreign-born workers, QiI .
The number of matches formed in each period is a standard function of the
number of vacancies posted and the number of unemployed workers in each mar-
ket. Defining labor market tightness as θi = vi/Ui, the matching function yields the
vacancy-filling rate µi = µ(θi) and the job-finding rate fi = f (θi) as
µi = ξθ
−
i , fi = ξθ
1−
i (1.7)
where  and ξ have the usual respective interpretations of matching function elas-
ticity and efficiency. Existing matches separate at the exogenous rate si j, which
6See below for an explanation of firm vacancy posting.
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differs between natives and immigrants as well as across skill-types in order to
generate the differential rates of unemployment across worker types that are ob-
served in the data (Battisti et al., 2014). The law of motion of employment is
E′i j = (1 − si j)Ei j + fi(Qi j − Ei j) (1.8)
The level of employment of type i j next period is equal to the sum of this
period’s employed workers that do not separate, and this period’s unemployed
workers who successfully find an employment match.
Firm Value Functions The resulting equations governing the value to a firm
producing good i of an open vacancy Vi and of a filled job Ji j are as follows
Vi = −κi + q
[
(1 − µi)V ′i + µi
(
(1 − φi)J′iN + φiJ′iI
)]
(1.9)
Ji j = pi − wi j + q
(
si jV ′i + (1 − si j)J′i j
)
(1.10)
where κi is the cost of posting a vacancy in labor market i. The discount rate of
the firm is q, which is the marginal rate of substitution of anyone with positive
holdings of the firm, as explained below. The variable φi = UiI/(UiI + UiN) denotes
the probability that any given filled vacancy is filled by an immigrant, which is
defined as the share of immigrants among those searching for a job. An open
vacancy is turned into a filled job at the rate µi.
Equation (1.9) demonstrates that the value to the firm of posting a vacancy in
market i is equal to the probability of becoming matched with a worker in that
market multiplied by the expected discounted gain from such an event less the
cost of posting a vacancy. Importantly, the value of an open vacancy has no index
j because firms cannot discriminate between native and immigrant workers when
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posting vacancies. Equation (1.10) demonstrates that the value of a match to the
firm is equal to the sum of the contemporary production surplus of that match
and the discounted expected value of the match persisting next period given that
the match will separate with probability si j.
Free entry of firms implies that, in equilibrium, Vi = 0 for all i, which implies
the following job creation condition
κi = qµi
(
(1 − φi)J′iN + φiJ′iI
)
(1.11)
Firms post vacancies until the cost of doing so is equal to the discounted expected
value of the surplus gained from posting a vacancy.
Asset Markets Households transfer wealth across time by investing in two as-
sets: capital k which is used as an input for production, and equity x, which is a
claim to the intermediate goods representative firm’s profit. Because both forms
of wealth holdings are risk free, no arbitrage equates the returns to each asset
which, after normalizing the total amount of equity to one, yields the following
relationship
1 + r′ − δ = d
′ + p′
p
where r is the return to capital and d is the dividend paid to the holders of eq-
uity, as given by Equation (1.5). Since capital and equity are equivalent from the
household’s viewpoint, the composition of the investment portfolio is irrelevant.
I therefore simplify the asset structure by defining a composite asset a according
to
a = (1 + r − δ)k + (p + d)x
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The price of the asset, q, is defined according to
q = 1/(1 + r′ − δ)
which is the inverse of the gross return to capital holdings or, equivalently, eq-
uity holdings. Simple algebra then implies that the following household budget
constraint
Ci j + k′i j + px
′
i j = (1 + r − δ)ki j + (p + d)xi j + Ei jwi j
can be reduced to
Ci j + qa′i j = ai j + Ei jwi j
This setup, which is equivalent to the asset structure proposed by Krusell et al.
(2010), determines the appropriate firm discount rate in the presence of heteroge-
neous households.
In the closed economy, aggregation implies that
∑
i j
ai j = (1 + r − δ)K + (p + d) (1.12)
where K is the aggregate capital stock used in production according to Equation
(1.1). In the open economy, I make the standard small open economy assumption
that the aggregate capital stock adjusts in order to satisfy Equation (1.13) in all
time periods.
r∗ = α
Y
K
(1.13)
where r∗ is the world interest rate, which is exogenously set equal to the steady
state value of the return on capital in the closed economy.
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Households Although individual workers face unemployment risk, households
of each type are comprised of a continuum of such workers who pool their in-
come. Investment and consumption decisions are therefore made at the level of
the household. The optimization problem of household i j is
Wi j(ai j;ω) = max
a′i j,Ci j
log
(
Ci j − bi jEi j
)
+ βWi j(a′i j;ω
′) (1.14)
subject to
Ci j + qa′i j = ai j + Ei jwi j and ai j ≥ 0, given ai j(0)
where Ci j is total consumption of the household, ω represents the aggregate state
which consists of all aggregate variables relevant to household decision making
and ai j(0) is initial wealth holdings. The household chooses this period’s con-
sumption and next period’s wealth holdings subject to its budget constraint and
taking the evolution of employment as given according to Equation (1.8). The
household receives labor income from its employed workers and asset income
from wealth.
The choice of preferences is a special case of those described by by Greenwood
et al. (1988). This specification allows an interpretation of bi j as a worker’s “out-
side option” in a manner that is consistent with the job search literature. The out-
side option is crucial in determining the total surplus of an employer-employee
match, and therefore the dynamics of the labor market. In a canonical search
model with linear preferences, the outside option can be interpreted as either the
amount of utility sacrificed by a worker in gaining employment, or as a mone-
tary unemployment benefit. Within the context of risk averse households, how-
ever, the equivalence between these interpretations breaks down. In particular,
the amount of utility sacrificed in gaining employment depends on the marginal
rate of substitution between leisure and consumption which in general depends
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on the wealth of a household. Similarly, the amount of utility derived from a mon-
etary unemployment benefit will depend on the marginal utility of consumption,
which also depends on wealth. As Krusell et al. (2010) demonstrate, the resulting
labor market dynamics therefore depend on the distribution and level of wealth
within the economy. The particular specification of preferences in Equation (1.14)
ensures that the disutility derived from labor is independent of wealth, which is
a well-known property of Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences.
The value to household i j of an extra worker is given by
WEi j (ai j;ω) =
(
Ci j − bi jEi j
)−1 (
wi j − bi j
)
+ β(1 − si j − fi)WEi j (a′i j;ω′)
The transition of an additional worker from a state of unemployment to em-
ployment yields an immediate utility-adjusted benefit from the wage net of the
outside option as well as an additional benefit derived from the implications for
having another worker in the next period.
Wage Determination Wages are determined through bilateral Nash bargaining
between households and the intermediate good firm, which divides the total sur-
plus from an employment match between the two parties according to the follow-
ing rule.
max
wi j
(
WEi j
)1−η
(Ji j)η (1.15)
where η ∈ (0, 1) represents the bargaining power of the worker. The solution to
(1.15) yields the following wage equation
wi j = η
(
pi + q fiJ′i j
)
+ (1 − η)bi j (1.16)
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which has the usual interpretation that the wage is equal to a weighted aver-
age of the worker’s contribution to production and the outside option, where the
weights are determined by the household’s bargaining power. In the case where
the household has no bargaining power (η = 0), the wage is simply the minimum
amount required to incentivize the household to provide another worker, which
is the outside option bi j. In the case where the household has full power in wage
negotiations (η = 1), the wage reflects the total amount of surplus to the firm
generated by the employment match.
Equilibrium A competitive equilibrium in the closed economy consists of
a set of allocations for each household {Ci j(t), ai j(t)}∞t=o, a set of prices
{r(t), q(t), p(t), pi(t),wi j(t)}∞t=0, a set of production stocks {K(t),Z(t),Yi(t)}∞t=0, a set of
profits and vacancies {d(t), vi(t)}∞t=0, a set of matching rates { fi(t), µi(t)}, a set of em-
ployment and unemployment stocks {Ei j,Ui j}∞t=0 and a set of labor market tight-
ness measures {θi}∞t=0 such that
1. Given the prices, the profits, and the job finding rates, the household alloca-
tions solve the optimization problem of household i j.
2. Given the prices and the vacancy matching rates, the aggregate inputs and
the vacancies solve the firms problem, where the profits are determined by
(1.5).
3. The intermediate input markets clear. In particular, Equations (1.3) and (1.4)
are satisfied.
4. The matching rates are determined by (1.7).
5. Wages are determined by the Nash bargaining condition (1.16).
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6. The free entry condition (1.11) for each skill type i is satisfied.
7. The numbers of employed and unemployed workers satisfy (1.8).
8. Capital markets clear so that the sum of individual asset holdings is consis-
tent with the aggregate capital stock. In particular, Equation (1.12) is satis-
fied.
A competitive equilibrium in the open economy coincides with that of a closed
economy except that the capital market clearing condition 8 is replaced by
8′. Open capital markets ensure that the aggregate capital stock immediately
adjusts to satisfy Equation (1.13) in all time periods.
Welfare I quantify the welfare effects of immigration in terms of compensating
consumption differentials (Lucas, 2003). In particular, I define λi j as the percent-
age change in initial consumption of household i j that would leave the utility of
that household unaffected by immigration. More formally, λi j solves
∞∑
t=0
βt log(C¯i j(1 + λi j) − bi jE¯i j) =
∞∑
t=0
βt log(Ci j(t) − bi jEi j(t)) (1.17)
where C¯i j and E¯i j are the initial steady state values of consumption and em-
ployment, respectively. A positive value of λi j corresponds to a welfare gain from
immigration. In the presentation of the quantitative results in sections 2.3 and 1.5,
I also present the steady state welfare gains λ∗i j defined as the solution to
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∞∑
t=0
βt log(C¯i j(1 + λi j) − bi jE¯i j) =
∞∑
t=0
βt log(C∗i j − bi jE∗i j) (1.18)
whereC∗i j and E
∗
i j are the long run steady state values of consumption and employ-
ment, respectively. The values of λi j and λ∗i j differ because the former incorporates
the welfare effects of the transition dynamics whereas the latter does not. Sections
2.3 and 1.5 demonstrate that, in general, the transition dynamics are costly so that
λi j < λ
∗
i j.
Computation Because of household heterogeneity, a one-to-one mapping be-
tween a household-level state variable ai j and the aggregate state, which includes
aggregate capital, does not exist. Because household decisions rely on the aggre-
gate state, the evolution of which must be consistent with the decisions of other
households, the model cannot be solved analytically. I use the following shooting
algorithm to solve for the transition dynamics which ensures that the value of the
post immigration experiment steady state asset holding positions are consistent
with the asset-accumulation dynamics of the pre-reform equilibrium and the de-
pendency of the wealth distribution on initial asset holdings (Mendoza and Tesar,
1998; Gorodnichenko et al., 2012).
For a given calibration, the resulting steady state values of labor market vari-
ables after an immigration shock can be determined analytically. This is a result
of the preferences described in Equation (1.14) which ensure that the disutility
derived from employment is independent of a household’s wealth, and therefore
also independent of the transition dynamics. The final steady state values of ag-
gregate capital K¯ and labor market tightness variables, θ¯L and θ¯H, can be derived
analytically.
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The computation algorithm for the closed economy is as follows.
1. For a given sufficiently long number of time periods T , choose a sequence
of aggregate capital stocks K = {K0, · · · ,KT = K¯}.
2. Choose a sequence of market tightness parameters for both the low-skill and
high-skill labor markets ΘL = {θL0, · · · , θLT = θ¯L}, ΘH = {θH0, · · · , θHT = θ¯H}.
3. Calculate the resulting sequence of job finding and vacancy filling proba-
bilities using Equation (1.7), employment stocks using Equation (1.8), factor
prices using Equations (1.1)-(1.4) and firm value functions using Equation
(1.10).
4. Using the values calculated in step 3, determine whether the job-creation
conditions (1.11) are satisfied. If not, update ΘL and ΘH and return to step 3.
Otherwise, proceed to step 5.
5. Use the sequence of wages and asset returns to solve each household’s op-
timization problem. Check that the sum of all resulting household asset
holdings are consistent with the level of the aggregate capital stock in each
period according to (1.12). If not, update K and return to step 1. Repeat until
convergence.
The computation algorithm for the open economy is simpler as it does not
require the outer aggregate capital loop.
1. Choose a sequence of market tightness parameters for both the low-skill and
high-skill labor markets ΘL = {θL0, · · · , θLT = θ¯L}, ΘH = {θH0, · · · , θHT = θ¯H}.
2. Calculate the resulting sequence of job finding and vacancy filling probabili-
ties using Equation (1.7), employment stocks using Equation (1.8). Calculate
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the resulting aggregate level of capital using (C.3.2) and the assumption that
r remains constant in each period. Calculate the resulting factor prices using
Equations (1.1)-(1.4) and firm value functions using Equation (1.10).
3. Using the values calculated in step 2, determine whether the job-creation
conditions (1.11) are satisfied. If not, update ΘL and ΘH and return to step 2.
Repeat until convergence.
1.3 Data and Calibration
Section 1.4 demonstrates that the direction and size of the effects of immigration
on the labor market and welfare crucially depend on the parameter values. In
order to generate quantitative results for the effect of immigration, I calibrate the
model to match key features of the United States economy over the last decade. I
define a time period as one quarter.
The model is characterized by 23 parameters which consist of the prefer-
ence parameters {β, bi j}, the labor force measures {Qi j}, the production parameters
{A, ρ, α, γ}, the matching function parameters {ξ, }, the workers’ bargaining power
η, the capital depreciation rate δ, the initial shares of wealth {ai j(0)}, the vacancy
posting costs {κi} and the separation rates {si j}. I partition the parameters into two
sets - Θ1 = {Qi j, β, ρ, α, κH, δ, , η, A, biI , ai j(0)} and Θ2 = {κL, biH, si j, ξ, γ}. I calibrate
the parameters in Θ1 by either directly matching values with an empirical coun-
terpart, by taking values common in the literature, or by normalization. I jointly
calibrate the parameters in Θ2 by matching moments.
I set the risk free steady state rate of return in the model equal to the real
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interest rate calculated by Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014) who use an inflation
adjusted measure of the 30-year treasury constant maturity bond rate of 4.76%
per annum, which implies a quarterly discount factor of β = 0.988. In the case
of the open economy, I fix the world interest rate at this level. I set the elasticity
of the matching function, , equal to 0.5, which is a commonly used value within
the range of estimates reported in Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001). Following
common practice, I set the Nash bargaining parameter η equal to 0.5 in accordance
with the efficiency condition proposed by Hosios (1990).
The elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled workers crucially
depends on the definition of each skill group. For example, Card (2009) finds that
workers with less than a high school education are perfect substitutes for those
with a high school education, regardless of age and experience. On the other
hand, the elasticity of substitution between workers with and without a college
education has consistently been estimated to be around 2 (Katz and Murphy, 1992;
Angrist, 1995; Johnson, 1997; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). I therefore define high
skilled workers to be those who have completed college, and set ρ = 1− 1
σHL
= 0.5,
which corresponds to an elasticity of substitution of σHL = 2.
I set the quarterly value of depreciation δ equal to 0.0182 which is equivalent
to the monthly rate of 0.0061 in Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014). I set the capital
share of income α equal to the standard 0.33. I choose the labor force shares Qi j to
match their empirical counterparts, which I calculate using monthly Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS) data downloaded from the Integrated Public Use Microdata
Samples (IPUMS) (Flood et al., 2015). I define immigrants as those workers born
outside the United States and high skilled workers as those with at least a college
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degree.7 Figure A.1 presents the seasonally adjusted time series of the respective
labor force shares over the decade from January 2005 to December 2014.
[Insert Figure A.1 about here]
Low-skilled native workers account for the majority of the United States labor
force at an average of 57.0% over the sample period, followed by high-skilled
natives at 26.1%, low skilled immigrants at 11.9% and high skilled immigrants at
5%. I directly match the values of Qi j to these figures after normalizing the total
population
∑
i j Qi j = 1.
I estimate the respective initial wealth shares of each worker type, ai j(0), using
the 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), which consists of a
short, rotating panel of 8 to 12 waves of data collected every 4 months for around
36,700 households in the United States. The survey contains core questions that
are common to each wave in addition to topical questions about particular topics
that are not updated in each wave. I use waves 4, 7 and 10, which contains infor-
mation on both household assets (in the topical module) and the birthplace and
education level of the respondent (in the core) over the 2009 to 2011 period. As
explained by Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2006), more commonly used datasets
containing wealth and asset information are less appropriate for considering the
allocation of wealth across immigrant and skill groups.8 The Survey of Consumer
Finances, for example, does not identify foreign-born individuals whereas the de-
7In the IPUMS dataset, these definitions correspond to the following variable values: bpl=9900
(foreign born), educ99>14 (college educated). A detailed description of these calculations is avail-
able upon request.
8Ben-Gad (2008) calibrates his model using the Survey of Consumer Finances to identify the
ratio of wealth between high and low skilled workers. He does not, however, distinguish between
native born and immigrant wealth.
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sign of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics does not include any immigrants
who arrived in the United States after 1968.9
Table A.1 presents the wealth shares of each worker type in each wave of the
2008 SIPP. On average between 2009 and 2011, native high skilled workers owned
86.7% of household wealth, followed by 8.5% for High skilled immigrants, 3.6%
for low skilled natives and just 1.2% for low skilled immigrants. Note that the
distribution of wealth is more skewed toward high skilled workers than these
figures suggest, given that high skilled workers make up a lower amount of the
United States labor force than their low-skilled counterparts, as demonstrated in
Figure A.1.
[Insert Table A.1 about here]
I normalize the high-skill vacancy posting cost κH to one and I set A in order
to normalize steady state output, Y , to one. Finally, I normalize the native out-
side options biN to zero. This simplifies the interpretation of the welfare results
because it ensures that native born welfare is fully determined by consumption
fluctuations rather than a combination of consumption and labor supply fluctua-
tions.
The parameters in Θ2 = {biN , si j, γ, κL, ξ} are jointly determined by 9 moment
matching conditions. I demonstrate in Appendix A.3 that the moment matching
procedure can be reduced to a system of nine simultaneous equations in nine
unknowns which allows me to exactly match the nine moments. A subjective
weighting of each moment is therefore not required.
9Although in 1990 the PSID added 2,000 Latino households consisting of families originally
from Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Cuba.
25
The first three moments are the respective average ratios of the wages of each
worker type with respect to the wages of high skill natives over the January 2005
to December 2014 sample period. Following much of the literature (Card, 1990), I
obtain wage data from the outgoing rotation groups of the CPS contained in the
IPUMS data. Figure A.2 plots the time series of nominal hourly wages (left hand
panel) as well as the resulting ratios with respect to high skilled native wages
(right hand panel). Figure A.2 demonstrates two main points. The first is that
within each skill group, native born workers earn a premium over their immi-
grant counterparts. Similarly, within nativity groups, high skilled workers earn
a premium over their low skilled counterparts. The wage ratio with respect to
high skilled natives is, on average over the sample period, 0.9618 for high-skilled
immigrants, 0.651 for low-skilled natives and 0.588 for low skilled immigrants.
[Insert Figure A.2 about here]
Unemployment rates of each worker type are the next four moment targets.
Using the IPUMS data, Figure A.3 plots the respective time series of unemploy-
ment rates over the sample period. High skilled natives experienced an average
unemployment rate of 3.4% while high skilled immigrants experiences a rate of
4.5%. Low skilled workers regardless of nativity faced a much higher unemploy-
ment rate of 8.7% for native workers. Interestingly, low-skilled immigrants expe-
rienced a lower average unemployment rate of 8.1%.
[Insert Figure A.3 about here]
Finally, I target the respective job finding rates within each labor market. The
IPUMS data contains information regarding the employment of individuals in
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consecutive months, which allows me to construct time series for the gross flows
of workers in each skill group between employment and unemployment. I use
these gross flow measures to calculate job finding rates according to the method-
ology of Shimer (2012), which accounts for aggregation bias by exploiting a con-
tinuous time environment.
Figure A.4 plots the series of instantaneous job finding rates for high skilled
(solid line) and low skilled (dashed line) workers over the last decade. Over the
entire period, high skilled workers have benefited from higher job finding rates
of 0.27 compared to 0.245 for low skill workers.
[Insert Figure A.4 about here]
The calibration results and targets are summarized in Table A.2.
[Insert Table A.2 about here]
1.4 Analysis
In this section, I analyze the theoretical mechanisms through which immigration
affects the labor market and welfare outcomes of native workers. I isolate each
mechanism using special cases of the parameter values.
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1.4.1 Basic Model
In this section, I equate the outside options and separation rates of all workers
(bi j = 0, si j = sHN). I also assume that high and low skill workers are perfect
substitutes (ρ = 1), have equal productivity (γ = 0.5) and that hiring costs are
homogeneous across labor markets (κL = κH = 1). Production is therefore reduced
to a standard Cobb-Douglas model with homogeneous labor and the effect of
immigration is to simply increase the supply of that labor. Table A.3 lists the
percentage changes for key variables in response to a 1% increase in the labor force
caused by either low skill immigration (columns 1 - 2) or high skill immigration
(columns 3 - 4) under the assumption that all workers hold the same amount of
wealth. Because wealth holdings and the accumulation of aggregate capital plays
a large role in determining the welfare effects in this model, I distinguish between
two extreme scenarios regarding the degree to which domestic asset markets are
open to foreign capital flows. Columns 1 and 3 represent an open economy that
is fully open to foreign capital flows, in which case the return to asset holdings is
unaffected by domestic factors. Columns 2 and 4 represent a closed economy in
which the aggregate capital stock is fully determined by the asset accumulation
decisions of domestic households.
[Insert Table A.3 about here]
Table A.3 demonstrates that an influx of immigrants of either skill level has no
effect on wages, unemployment or goods prices in the long run after capital ad-
justs to leave factor prices unaltered. A general property of this model is that the
steady state values of the labor market variables do not depend on the transition
dynamics. This is a direct consequence of the Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences
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specified in Equation (1.14), which ensure that worker outside options, and there-
fore labor market dynamics are not affected by household wealth. The steady
state outcomes of these labor market variables do not, however, fully determine
the overall welfare effects. This is because consumption decisions, which ulti-
mately affect welfare, depend on asset accumulation as well as the dynamics of
labor market variables.
Columns 1 and 3 of Table A.3 show that when capital immediately adjusts
to leave asset returns unaltered, the present value of labor income is also unal-
tered and therefore utility is unaffected by immigration, either on impact or in the
long run. Thus, the welfare implications derived from a static neoclassical model
with a perfectly elastic supply of capital coincide with my framework under the
assumptions of this section when capital markets are open to foreign investment.
However, when the economy is closed, the immigration-induced increase in
labor supply temporarily increases the marginal product of capital and therefore
the rate of return to wealth holdings. This incentivizes households to accumulate
wealth. Columns 2 and 4 demonstrate that there is a long-run welfare gain equal
to a 0.24% permanent increase in the level of initial consumption as a result of the
accumulation of wealth over the transition period. This long run welfare gain,
however, is almost completely offset by the reduction in labor income as labor
market conditions temporarily worsen over the transition.10 Table A.3 demon-
strates that the transition costs reduce the welfare gain by 99% (0.24 vs 0.0006). In
this scenario, the effect of immigration on the welfare of native born workers is
similar in an open or closed economy.
10This difference in long run utility gain between closed and open economies has been examined
in the context of capital tax reforms by Mendoza and Tesar (1998).
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Figure A.5, which plots the adjustment path of labor market tightness, unem-
ployment and wages of native workers in response to an immigration-induced 1%
increase in the total labor force, helps to illustrate why the welfare results differ
between the open and the closed economy cases. The red dashed lines illustrate
the behavior of variables in the open economy, where capital immediately adjusts
to equate asset returns. Because labor is homogeneous, the constant rate of re-
turn on capital implies a constant marginal product of labor. There is therefore no
change in the hiring incentives of firms or wages.
[Insert Figure A.5 about here]
The blue solid lines represent the closed economy. Immigration reduces the
marginal product of labor because the aggregate capital stock is sluggish to re-
spond. This reduces the bargaining position of workers, which negatively im-
pacts wages and unemployment until steady prices are restored. Why, then, is the
overall welfare gain to natives positive (6× 10−4), despite the reduction in the pre-
set value of labor income? Because households also generate asset income. Over
the transition, the temporary increase in asset returns caused by the immigration-
induced increase in the marginal product of capital more than makes up for the
loss in labor earnings.
1.4.2 Capital Surplus Channel - Heterogeneous Wealth Holdings
Table A.4 presents the equivalent results to Table A.3 with the exception that
household wealth shares are consistent with the empirical observations presented
in section 1.3. The neutral long run effects on the labor market are unaltered
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because of the preference specification in Equation (1.14) that ensures that each
worker’s outside option is independent of wealth. However, when the economy
is closed, the welfare effects of immigration are affected by initial wealth holdings.
In particular, the long run welfare gains (0.41% vs 0.11%) and total welfare gains
(0.17% vs -0.13%) are now much larger for high-skilled native households. High
skilled native households begin with a much larger share of national wealth, as
demonstrated in Table A.1, which means that they are less reliant upon labor in-
come. Therefore, the reduction in the present value of labor income caused by
immigration can be “buffered” by a sufficiently large amount of wealth. The la-
bor income of low skilled households, however, dominates asset income which
results in a welfare loss for these households.
[Insert Table A.4 about here]
1.4.3 Price Channel - Imperfect Substitution across Skill Groups
In this section, I analyze the case in which all workers remain identical in terms of
outside options (bi j = 0), separation rates, (si j = sHN) and productivity (γ = 0.5) but
that high and low skill workers are no longer perfect substitutes (ρ = 0.5), despite
hiring costs remaining the same across labor markets (κL = κH = 1). Under this
scenario, immigration affects the relative skill composition of the labor force, and
therefore alters the relative prices of each intermediate good pi. Equation (1.19)
presents the steady state value to a firm of an employment match with worker i j.
Ji j =
(1 − η)(pi − bi j)
1 − β(1 − si j − η fi) (1.19)
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Equation (1.19) demonstrates that an increase in pi increases the value to the firm
of a match in labor market i, which incentivizes hiring and leads to more em-
ployment in that labor market. The improvement in workers’ bargaining posi-
tions also positively influences wages. The corresponding results in Table A.5
are consistent with this insight. Low skill immigration (columns 1 - 2) increases
(decreases) the wages of high (low) skill workers by 0.44% (0.33%), which are
reflected in similar changes to goods prices. This is the redistributive effect of
skill-biased immigration that is predicted by classical factor demand theory (Bor-
jas, 2014). In a competitive setup, the effect on prices and wages coincide, but the
labor search frictions in the model create a wedge between these goods and labor
prices. Nevertheless, these results are consistent with long run wage elasticities of
0.3 - 0.4 that are estimated within competitive frameworks (Borjas, 2003; Ben-Gad,
2008).
[Insert Table A.5 about here]
The non-Walrasian labor market framework also allows the analysis of un-
employment effects. The change in producer surplus caused by the price effects
of immigration also alter the vacancy posting decisions of firms. Thus, low skill
immigration reduces (increases) high (low) skill unemployment. As a result of
these labor market changes, low skill immigration unsurprisingly increases (re-
duces) the present value of labor income for high (low) skill workers. For both
types of workers, labor income is superior in the open economy because a more
responsive aggregate capital stock leads to higher levels of the marginal products
of labor over the transition period. Figure A.6, which plots the transition dynam-
ics of labor market variables in response low skill immigration, demonstrates this
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point. The open economy responses exhibit higher levels of wages and lower lev-
els of unemployment over the transition period. Note that, in contrast to Figure
A.5, the red dashed line that represents the economy with open capital flows is
not a flat line. Within an environment with two skill groups, a constant rate of
return to capital no longer implies a constant marginal product of labor. Instead,
the relative marginal products adjust according to the skill composition of the em-
ployed labor force. Because search frictions ensure that employment stocks adjust
gradually, so too do marginal products and therefore wages and unemployment.
[Insert Figure A.6 about here]
High (low) skill households experience welfare gains (losses), both in the long
run and after accounting for transition costs. Long run welfare gains are always
higher in the closed economy compared to the open economy because the wealth
accumulation over the transition period results in higher levels of asset income in
the long run while long run labor income are unaltered across the closed and open
economies. The total welfare effects, however, depend on whether the reduction
in the present vale of labor market earnings are offset by higher asset returns over
the transition period.
The qualitative results are reversed in columns 3 - 4. High skill immigration
worsens (improves) the labor market outcomes of high (low) skill workers. As a
result, high (low) skill households experience welfare losses (gains). The mag-
nitudes of the changes induced by high skill immigration are larger than low
skill immigration. This is because the population of high skilled workers is much
smaller than low skilled workers, as presented in Section 1.3 and Figure A.1. As
a result, a 1% increase in the labor force that arises out of an increase in high skill
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workers distorts the skill composition of the labor force to a larger degree.
1.4.4 Hiring Cost Channel - Heterogeneous Workers
In this section, I analyze the case in which high and low skill workers are perfect
substitutes (ρ = 1) but where workers differ according to their outside options (bi j)
and separation rates (si j).11 Under these assumptions, an increase in the number
of immigrants increases the probability, φi, that a given vacancy within each labor
market is filled by an immigrant. Native workers command a wage premium over
their immigrant counterparts due to having higher outside options. This means
that an increased likelihood of hiring an immigrant lowers the expected wage to
be paid by a firm and therefore raises the expected value of posting a vacancy.
Firms are incentivized to post vacancies, which increases employment and wages
via an increase in the worker’s bargaining position. Chassamboulli and Palivos
(2014) and Battisti et al. (2014) study this hiring cost channel within a static setting.
Table A.6 demonstrates that a low-skill immigration-induced 1% increase in
the labor force (columns 1 - 2) lowers the expected cost of hiring in the low skill
market and, through its effect on hiring incentives, lowers long run unemploy-
ment by 0.37%. The tighter labor market conditions increase the bargaining po-
sition of low skill workers, which also results in higher (0.04%) long run wages.
Wages and unemployment in the high skill market are unaffected in the long run
because there is no skill-composition effect of the type explored in section 1.4.3,
and the likelihood of hiring an immigrant is unchanged in the high skill market.
11Because equilibrium conditions cannot be satisfied with equal productivity and hiring costs
within each labor market, I also set γ and κL to their respective calibrated values.
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[Insert Table A.6 about here]
Figure A.7, which presents the transition dynamics of the labor market vari-
ables in response to low skill immigration, demonstrates that the neutral long run
labor market effects mask substantial short run fluctuations in the closed econ-
omy. The relatively sluggish response of capital in comparison to the open econ-
omy keeps the marginal product of labor below its steady state level. This reduces
the surplus to firms in the high skill market, which temporarily raises unemploy-
ment and reduces wages. Thus, the present value of labor earnings for high skill
workers decreases, as demonstrated in Table A.6. In the open economy, however,
the high skill labor market is unaffected, and behaves as it does in the case of the
basic model presented in section 1.4.1. The reduction in the marginal product of
labor over the transition period is dominated by the reduction in hiring costs for
low skill workers. Thus, low skill labor earnings increases.
[Insert Figure A.7 about here]
The qualitative welfare impacts of immigration reflect the labor earnings ef-
fects. In particular, low (high) skill immigration reduces welfare for high (low)
skill workers in the closed economy, as the capital surplus gains from wealth hold-
ings are outweighed by the negative impact on labor earnings. However, the
hiring cost effect ensures that low (high) skill households benefit from low (high)
skill immigration. Finally, the welfare of high (low) skill workers is unaffected by
(low) high skill immigration in the open economy.
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1.5 Results
Table A.7 presents the main results. Low skill immigration improves the long
run wages of high skill workers by 0.45% and reduces the long run wages of low
skill workers by 0.27%. These figures can be interpreted as long run wage elas-
ticities and are roughly consistent with the wage elasticity estimates of between
-0.3 and -0.4 in frameworks with competitive labor markets (Borjas, 2003; Ben-
Gad, 2008), as well as the empirical literature. For example, in their meta analysis
of 344 empirical estimates of the impact of immigration on wages, Longhi et al.
(2005) find an average elasticity of -0.12. Thus, it is the traditional price chan-
nel that dominates the hiring cost channel in wage setting, which is also reflected
in the magnitudes of the corresponding changes to goods prices. The relative
magnitudes of these channels in wage setting is consistent with the findings of
Chassamboulli and Palivos (2013). I find that high skilled immigration reduces
the long run wages of high skilled workers by 0.91% and improves the wages of
low-skilled workers by 0.67%. As discussed in section 1.4.3, the larger elastici-
ties caused by high skill immigration are primarily a result of differences in the
size of the respective labor forces. Table A.2 records that high skill workers only
account for approximately 30% of the labor force. Thus, for a given immigration-
induced increase in the population, the skill composition of the labor force is more
dramatically affected if that increase is comprised of high skill workers.
[Insert Table A.7 about here]
Immigration, regardless of its skill composition, lowers long run unemploy-
ment. I find a long run “unemployment elasticity” of between -0.04 and -0.30,
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which indicates that the hiring cost channel dominates the price channel in the
determination of employment. The relative magnitudes of these channels in the
determination of employment outcomes is also consistent with the findings of
Chassamboulli and Palivos (2013). Low skill immigration, for example, lowers
the productivity of low skill workers which is reflected in a reduction in low skill
wages. However, this reduction in productivity is offset by a corresponding re-
duction in hiring cost, which, on balance, promotes hiring activity. These findings
are also somewhat consistent with the empirical literature. In their meta analy-
sis of 165 estimates of the impact of immigration on employment, Longhi et al.
(2006) find that employment of the native born reduces by an average of 0.03% in
the US, and -0.84% in countries other than the US, but with a range from -3.9% to
6.2%. In the United States there appears to be a small net job creation effect, which
is consistent with my findings, while European labour markets have a ‘crowding
out’ effect.
In the cases where immigration reduces wages but improves employment, it
is the former that dominates in terms of the present value of labor earnings, cal-
culated by discounting labor income by the steady state return on wealth. For
example, low skill immigration reduces the present value of labor earnings for
low skilled households by 0.12% in the open economy, despite also reducing the
long run unemployment rate of low skill workers by 0.30%.
I now turn toward the welfare effect of capital stock elasticity. As the economy
responds to an immigration influx, there is a transition period during which the
labor market adjusts to its new steady state equilibrium. The dynamic response of
labor market variables to low skill immigration is presented in Figure A.8, which
demonstrates that the dynamics crucially depend on the responsiveness of the
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aggregate capital stock. The relatively sluggish response of the capital stock in
the closed economy through heightened domestic savings ensures a longer tran-
sition period than in an open economy, in which capital is constantly imported to
leave its rate of return constant. The economy takes approximately one decade
(40 quarters) to reach the steady state in the open economy compared to around
40 years (160 quarters) in the closed economy. These transition periods are con-
sistent with those found in the neoclassical framework of Ben-Gad (2008), which
indicates that capital frictions are more important than labor market frictions in
determining the long run adjustment of the economy to immigration.
[Insert Figure A.8 about here]
Not only is the transition period more protracted in the closed economy, but la-
bor productivity in any given period is lower in comparison to the open economy.
Consequently, wages are always lower, and unemployment always higher in any
given period following immigration until the steady state is reached in the closed
economy. The present value of labor earnings is therefore always lower in a closed
economy. Table A.7 shows that, for example, low skill immigration raises the
present value of high skill household labor earnings by 0.45% in an open economy
but just 0.31% in a closed economy. The ultimate effect on welfare, however, also
depends on how wealth income changes between the open and closed economies.
The welfare results across columns 1 and 2 demonstrate that high skill households
benefit from low skill immigration to a much larger degree in the closed economy
(0.30% vs 0.17%). This indicates that the gains from asset income over the more
protracted transition period offset the corresponding reductions in labor income.
However, the opposite is true for the less wealthy low skill households. Because
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low skill households derive a larger proportion of their income from labor, any
gains in asset returns are more than offset by the corresponding reduction in la-
bor earnings. Thus, low skill households experience a welfare gain from high skill
immigration of 0.67% in the open economy compared to just 0.50% in the closed
economy.
1.6 Conclusion
Current migration policies are among the largest economic distortions in the
world economy. Driving these policies are concerns for the welfare effects of im-
migration on native-born workers. Understanding these effects is therefore cru-
cial not just for native-born workers, but also for the substantial proportion of the
world population who wish to migrate.
In this article, I examine the welfare effects of immigration within a general
equilibrium framework calibrated to match key features of the United States econ-
omy over the last decade. I construct a fully dynamic search and matching model
in which migrants and natives differ according to their outside options, separa-
tion rates, wealth holdings and skill composition.
Migrants affect native-born welfare by shifting the skill composition of the la-
bor force, by lowering the hiring cost of firms, by temporarily raising the rates
of returns to wealth holdings, and by temporarily lowering the average marginal
product of labor. I find that immigration of one skill type lowers the long run
wages of that skill type, raises the long run wages of the other skill type, and re-
duces the long run unemployment rates for all workers. The overall effect of the
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changes in labor market conditions caused by high (low) skill immigration is to
reduce the discounted present value of labor income for high (low) skill house-
holds and increase the discounted present value of labor income for low (high)
skill workers.
The magnitude of the changes in the present value of labor earnings crucially
depends on the responsiveness of the aggregate capital stock to immigration. I
find that an open economy, in which capital is constantly imported to leave its
rate of return constant, significantly improves the impact of immigration on labor
earnings in comparison to a closed economy in which the response of the capital
stock is relatively sluggish. The closed economy, however, exhibits higher rates of
return to wealth.
I find that low (high) skill immigration results in a welfare loss for high (low)
skill native households and a welfare gain for low (high) skill native households.
The welfare of high skill households, which are wealthier than their low skill
counterparts, is improved in a closed economy in comparison to the open econ-
omy. On the other hand, the less wealthy low skill households prefer the open
economy because labor rather than wealth is their dominant source of income.
By computing the full transition dynamics of the economy as it adjusts to immi-
gration, this article suggests that wealth holdings are a key determinant of the
welfare effects of immigration.
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CHAPTER 2
WELFARE ANALYSIS IN AN EXTENDED HARRIS-TODARO MODEL: AN
APPLICATION OF THE ATKINSON THEOREM
2.1 Introduction
Most people in the developing world derive all their income from employment
(World Bank, 2012). The structure of labor markets, and the policies enacted
within them, therefore dramatically affect the lives of the poor. The multi-sector
labor market model of Harris and Todaro (1970) (HT) remains the basic frame-
work for a vast literature devoted to analyzing labor market policies in devel-
oping economies. These analyses primarily focus on wages and unemployment,
while ignoring the welfare consequences of labor market policies. One reason for
this oversight is that it is generally difficult, within such models, to draw robust
welfare conclusions that do not critically depend on the specific welfare criterion
adopted (Temple, 2005). For example, in one of the few welfare economic analy-
ses in this literature, Fields (2005) shows that the welfare consequences of various
labor market policies are ambiguous even when restricting the analysis to abbre-
viated welfare functions.
In this article, I derive welfare conclusions that are both unambiguous and
robust to alternative specifications of welfare criteria. I do so by exploiting the
classic Atkinson (1970) welfare theorem, which specifies conditions under which
one can make welfare statements for an extremely broad class of social welfare
functions. The usefulness of this theorem is generally limited by its lack of appli-
cability because its conditions are seldom satisfied in practice (Dutta, 2002). Thus,
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the direct application of the Atkinson (1970) theorem can itself be considered an
additional contribution of this article.
I consider the generalized HT framework of Fields (1989), which incorporates
two of the more important subsequent extensions in the literature – informal sec-
tor dualism and on-the-job search. Within this framework, I analyze two labor
market policies. The first, modern sector enlargement (MSENL), was the primary
policy considered by HT and is now the benchmark policy for analyzing and com-
paring the structure of labor market models within the literature. The second, in-
creasing the efficiency of on-the-job search from the urban informal sector (IEOS),
is a novel policy enabled by informal sector dualism and on-the-job search.
I demonstrate that MSENL causes a Lorenz worsening of the income distribu-
tion and IEOS causes a Lorenz improvement. This is a novel result in itself given
that policies within HT frameworks do not generally result in income distribu-
tions with non-intersecting Lorenz curves (Temple, 2005). I also demonstrate that
both MSENL and IEOS do not alter the mean of the income distribution. These
properties satisfy the strict conditions of the Atkinson (1970) theorem, which I
then invoke to conclude that MSENL reduces social welfare and IEOS improves
social welfare for all anonymous, increasing and Schur-concave social welfare
functions.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2.2, I describe the salient features of
the extended Harris-Todaro model of Fields (1989). I conduct the welfare analysis
in section 2.3 and conclude in section 2.4.
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2.2 Model
Fields (1989) defines three employment sectors – the urban modern sector (M),
the urban traditional sector (T ), and the agricultural sector (A). The urban mod-
ern sector pays the highest wage, WM, which is exogenously set above the market
clearing level by a combination of institutional and market forces. Thus, all work-
ers aspire to jobs in this sector, but employment is fixed at a level EM. Workers
may elect to search for these jobs by opting for one of three search strategies.
Strategy I is identical to the Harris and Todaro (1970) (HT) strategy of directing
all effort toward search while being openly unemployed. Strategy II is to search
part time while accepting low-wage employment in the land-abundant agricul-
tural sector at a fixed wage WA. Strategy III is to search part time from the urban
traditional sector, while accepting low-wage employment at an endogenous wage
WT , assuming that a fixed amount of total earnings in the traditional sector, QT , is
allocated evenly across workers, LT , such that WT = QTLT .
The probability of finding a job using strategy I is pi, which is determined en-
dogenously and described in Equation (2.1) below. The expected earnings from
this strategy are therefore VI = piWM. Workers who adopt search strategy II
face a reduced probability θpi of obtaining a high-wage job, where 1 > θ > 0,
because such workers can only devote part of their time to searching while
maintaining agricultural employment. Expected earnings from strategy II are
VII = WMθpi + WA(1 − θpi). Workers who opt for strategy III face a probability ϕpi
of finding a job in the urban modern sector. The corresponding expected earn-
ings are VIII = WMϕpi + WT (1 − ϕpi). It is assumed that 1 > ϕ > θ > 0 because
the geographical distance between the agricultural and urban sector means that
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agricultural workers experience substantial inconvenience when searching for a
job compared to traditional workers located in urban areas. The HT model is ob-
tained within this framework by removing the urban traditional sector (QT = 0)
and on-the-job search (ϕ = θ = 0).
Denoting the number of workers electing search strategy i ∈ {I, II, III} by Li,
the probability of finding a job using strategy I is defined as
pi =
EM
LI + θLII + ϕLIII
(2.1)
The probability of finding a modern sector job is a function of the ex-ante number
of workers who initially choose each search strategy, rather than the resulting ex-
post allocations of workers across the three employment sectors. The relationships
between the ex-post and ex-ante allocations are described by Equations (2.2)-(2.5).
LM = EM = pi(LI + θLII + ϕLIII) (2.2)
LA = LII(1 − θpi) (2.3)
LT = LIII(1 − ϕpi) (2.4)
U = LI(1 − pi) (2.5)
Equation (2.2) demonstrates that modern sector employment LM is fixed at EM,
which is comprised of the successful job searchers from each of the search strate-
gies. Equations (2.3) - (2.5) demonstrate that agricultural employment LA, urban
traditional sector employment LT , and open unemployment U are determined
by the number of workers who are unsuccessful in obtaining high-wage employ-
ment from search strategy II, III and I, respectively. The ex-ante and ex-post labor
market clearing conditions are given by
L = LI + LII + LIII = LM + LT + LA + U (2.6)
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The L workers in the economy initially allocate themselves across the three search
strategies. Once the labor market clears, workers find themselves in one of the
four employment states. Search strategies are chosen in order to maximize ex-
pected earnings. An interior solution to this problem therefore requires that all
three search strategies yield the same expected value. That is,
VI = VII = VIII (2.7)
The model, which is represented by Equations (2.1) - (2.7), can be solved for the
following ex-post allocations of workers in terms of exogenous variables.1
LT =
QT (1 − θ)
WA(1 − ϕ) −
QT (ϕ − θ)
WM(1 − ϕ) (2.8)
LA =
L
1 − θ(1 − WAWM )
− EMWM
WA
− QT
WA
(2.9)
U = L − LT − LA − EM (2.10)
Total income in the economy is given by
I = QT + LAWA + EMWM (2.11)
2.3 Welfare Analysis
I evaluate the welfare effects of a policy of modern sector enlargement (MSENL)
and a policy of increasing the efficiency of on-the-job search from the urban in-
formal sector (IEOS) by comparing equilibrium income distributions before and
after the application of each policy. MSENL is modeled as an increase in EM, while
IEOS is modeled as an increase in ϕ.
1The derivations can be found in Appendix B.2.
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In general, making unambiguous welfare comparisons depends critically on
which specific welfare criterion is adopted. Thereom 1, proposed by Atkinson
(1970) and later extended by Dasgupta et al. (1973), states that under certain con-
ditions, however, the welfare of one income distribution may be ranked relative
to another for a broad range of social welfare functions.
Theorem 1. Let X and Y be two income distributions with equal means. Let W denote
the class of anonymous, increasing and Schur-concave social welfare functions. Then, X
Lorenz dominates Y if and only if w(X) > w(Y) for all w ∈W.
Theorem 1 facilitates the welfare analysis in two ways. First, it reduces an anal-
ysis of welfare to one of inequality. If workers derive utility solely from income,
which is implied by the search strategy behavior described by Equation (2.7), then
an income distribution that Lorenz dominates another with the same mean is not
only more equal, but better in terms of welfare. Thus, Theorem 1 ensures that the
income distribution provides sufficient information to make welfare inferences.
Second, Theorem 1 ensures the robustness of any welfare implications, be-
cause the great majority of accepted social welfare functions are included within
W. Anonymity simply requires that all workers are treated identically regardless
of which particular ones receive how much income. The “increasing” property
ensures that social welfare increases whenever one worker’s earnings increase,
holding other workers earnings constant. Finally, Schur-concavity, - a weaker
condition than concavity - ensures that the “transfer principle” of Pigou (1912)
and Dalton (1920) is satisfied. That is, a welfare function registers an increase in
well-being when income is transferred from a richer to a poorer worker without
reversing the ranking of each. I address the prerequisite of Theorem 1 in Proposi-
tion 1.
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Proposition 1. MSENL and IEOS do not affect the mean of the income distribution.
Proof. The model emits explicit equations for labor allocations and earnings. I can
therefore assess the impact of MSENL and IEOS by evaluating derivatives with
respect to EM and ϕ, respectively. Because population is fixed at L, it is sufficient
to show that total income, I, is unchanged. It follows from Equation (2.11) that
∂I
∂EM
=
∂LA
∂EM
WA + WM (2.12)
∂I
∂ϕ
=
∂LA
∂ϕ
(2.13)
because QT , WA and WM are exogenously fixed. Equation (2.9) implies that
∂LA
∂EM
= −WMWA and ∂LA∂ϕ = 0. Respectively substituting these expressions into (2.12)
and (C.3.1) yields ∂I
∂EM
= 0 and ∂I
∂ϕ
= 0 as required. 
Proposition 1 demonstrates that MSENL and IEOS reallocate workers and
earnings across sectors in a manner that is neutral in terms of total income, thereby
allowing Theorem 1 to be applied. It therefore remains to determine whether the
labor market policies yield non-intersecting Lorenz curves.
Proposition 2. MSENL causes a Lorenz worsening.
Proof. Workers fall into one of four employment categories. A Lorenz curve there-
fore consists of four piecewise linear segments, each characterized by the position
of three kink points as shown in Figure B.1. Without loss of generality, I normal-
ize I = 1 and L = 1 so that the coordinates of the kink points are K1 = (U, 0),
K2 = (U + LT ,QT ) and K3 = (1 − EM, 1 −WM · EM). Equations (2.8)-(2.10) imply
∂U
∂EM
=
WM
WA
− 1 > 0 , ∂LT
∂EM
= 0
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The increase in unemployment shifts K1 to the right which also shifts K2 to the
right because LT is unchanged. The vertical position of K2 is unaltered because QT
is exogenously fixed. The increase in EM directly shifts K3 down and to the left.
The resulting Lorenz curve following MSENL lies partly below and never above
the original Lorenz curve as depicted by the dashed red line in Figure B.1. This is
a Lorenz worsening. 
[Insert Figure B.1 about here]
Proposition 3. IEOS causes a Lorenz improvement.
Proof. Equations (2.8)-(2.10) imply
∂U
∂ϕ
= −QT (1 − θ)
(1 − ϕ)2
[
1
WA
− 1
WM
]
< 0 ,
∂LT
∂ϕ
=
QT (1 − θ)
(1 − ϕ)2
[
1
WA
− 1
WM
]
> 0,
∂LA
∂ϕ
= 0
The decrease in unemployment shifts K1 to the left. Because EM and LA are
unaffected, U + LT = L − EM − LA is unchanged and therefore K2 remains in its
horizontal position. K2 also remains in its vertical position because QT is exoge-
nously fixed. Fixed levels of EM and WM ensure that K3 is unaltered. The result-
ing Lorenz curve following IEOS lies partly above and never below the original
Lorenz curve as depicted by the dotted green line in Figure B.1. This is a Lorenz
improvement. 
Propositions 2 and 3 demonstrate that both policies produce strict Lorenz or-
derings. In isolation, these results imply that MSENL increases inequality and
IEOS decreases inequality. When combined with Theorem 1 and Proposition 1,
however, the findings also have normative significance. Theorem 2, which is the
main result of this article, follows directly from Theorem 1 and Propositions 1-3.
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Theorem 2. For all anonymous, increasing and Schur-concave social welfare functions,
MSENL decreases social welfare and IEOS increases social welfare.
2.4 Conclusion
Within the context of the generalized Harris-Todaro model proposed by Fields
(1989), I demonstrate that both MSENL and IEOS do not alter the mean of the in-
come distribution. I then show that MSENL causes a Lorenz worsening and IEOS
causes a Lorenz improvement. These properties allow me to draw robust welfare
conclusions by exploiting Atkinson’s (1970) classic theorem, which demonstrates
that Lorenz orderings coincide with welfare orderings for a very broad class of
welfare functions. I conclude that a policy of MSENL therefore reduces social
welfare while a policy of IEOS improves social welfare.
This article makes three contributions. First, it extends the work of Fields
(2005), who performs welfare economic analyses within the basic HT framework,
to the more complex multi-sector labor market model of Fields (1989). Second, it
widens the scope of policy analysis to include welfare effects that are robust to all
anonymous, increasing and Schur-concave social welfare functions. Third, and
relatedly, it provides what is to my knowledge the first direct application of the
Atkinson (1970) theorem within a multi-sector labor market model.
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CHAPTER 3
LAFFER CURVES IN THE PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
3.1 Introduction
“I am leaving because you believe success, creation, talent, anything different
must be sanctioned.”
- Gerard Depardieu
The Maastricht Treaty, which removed all legal barriers to migration within the
European Union, improved the ability of Europeans to vote with their feet. The
emergence of preferential tax schemes for high-skilled foreign workers indicates
an increasing recognition of this fact by many European governments (OECD,
2011). However, despite a long standing recognition of the importance of interna-
tional migration for the design of fiscal policy (Tiebout, 1956; Mirrlees, 1971), there
is surprisingly little research examining its implications for the explicit ability of
governments to generate tax revenue. This article aims to help fill the gap.
This issue is of particular concern at the moment, with Europe facing unprece-
dented sovereign debt levels in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The
majority of EU countries remain in violation of the public debt ceiling of 60 per-
cent of GDP and the 3 percent government deficit limit imposed by the Maastricht
Treaty, and the Stability and Growth Pact, respectively. In response to this dete-
rioration in their public finances, a number of European countries have adopted
austerity packages that feature increases in tax rates (Mendoza et al., 2014), with
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the intention of raising revenue in order to ease fiscal concerns.
However, increases in tax rates do not always lead to an increase in govern-
ment revenue. On the contrary, I show that mobile labor within Europe implies
that the majority of European countries would be more effective in raising gov-
ernment revenue if they reduced tax rates. That is, Europe is currently on the
“slippery slope” of the Laffer curve.
In order to show this, I construct a static two country neoclassical model simi-
lar to Razin and Sadka (2011) in which the government collects distortionary taxes
on labor and capital income, and in which all factors of production are free to
move across countries. I demonstrate that international migration increases the
elasticity of total labor supply with respect to changes in the after tax wage by
inducing cross border movements of workers. This has the effect of shifting the
Laffer curve for both labor and capital taxes to the left.
The labor supply elasticity is known to be a crucial determinant of the shape
and location of the Laffer curve (Mankiw and Weinzierl, 2006). I show that in-
ternational migration is quantitatively more important. Specifically, I find that
increasing the labor supply elasticity from 0.5 to 1.5 in a closed economy without
migration shifts the location of the peak of the labor tax Laffer curve from a labor
tax rate of 66% to 39% for the aggregate EU-14 (the EU-15 excluding Luxembourg)
economy. Removing restrictions on labor migration, on the other hand, shifts the
peak from 66% to 28% while maintaining the labor supply elasticity of 0.5. Simi-
larly, the peak of the capital tax Laffer curve shifts from a capital tax rate of 30%
to 14% upon increasing the labor supply elasticity in a closed economy. The rev-
enue maximizing tax rate when labor is internationally mobile is just 4%. Given
that the average labor and capital rates are currently 41% and 33% respectively,
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these estimates imply that the average EU-14 economy is currently situated on
the “slippery slope” of both the labor and capital tax Laffer curves. That is, the
majority of European countries ought to reduce tax rates in order to increase tax
revenue.
Methodologically, this article is most closely related to the work of Mankiw
and Weinzierl (2006) and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). Mankiw and Weinzierl
(2006) investigate the implications of the neoclassical growth model for dynamic
scoring. Like this article, their analysis yields simple formulas to show how much
a tax cut is self-financing once dynamic feedback effects are taken into account.
Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) extend Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) to gain quanti-
tative estimates across different countries. Furthermore, like the analysis in this
article, they explicitly characterize the shape of the Laffer curves. In particular,
they identify the revenue maximizing tax rates as well as the additional revenue
to be gained by adopting those tax rates.
Both Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), however,
follow most of the the large macroeconomic literature on revenue estimation (Ire-
land, 1994; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 1997; Leeper and Yang, 2008; Holter et al.,
2014) by treating countries as isolated economic units, thereby ignoring the po-
tential for the erosion of tax bases induced by factor mobility. Although Mirrlees
(1982, p. 319) recognized that “high tax rates encourage emigration” and that
“the resulting loss of tax revenue is widely believed to be an important reason for
keeping taxes down,” to my knowledge there is no explicit research examining
the effect of migration on a government’s ability to raise tax revenue.
In more recent work, Mendoza et al. (2014, p. 1) rightly point out that “there
has been surprisingly little discussion of the constraints imposed on fiscal policy
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by the fact the eurozone countries are highly integrated.” However, their analysis
of European Laffer curves considers only capital and goods market integration,
while ignoring labor mobility. Nevertheless, their finding that the international
mobility of capital allows for a more elastic capital tax base which shifts the Laffer
curve to the left is analogous to my result. Traditional closed economy models
that restrict the mobility of production factors underestimate the elasticity of tax
bases, thereby overestimating the ability of the government to raise tax revenue
at relatively high tax rates.
The importance of migration on fiscal policy decisions does, however, have a
long history in the optimal taxation literature. Commenting on the migration re-
strictions imposed in his seminal paper, Mirrlees (1971, p. 176) states that “since
the threat of migration is a major influence on...actual tax systems...this is another
assumption one would rather not make.” He later relaxed this assumption to de-
rive an optimal average tax rate that is inversely proportional to the elasticity of
migration (Mirrlees, 1982). Many studies examining optimal tax rates in the pres-
ence of migration have followed (Leite-Monteiro, 1997; Simula and Trannoy, 2010;
Lehmann et al., 2014).
Finally, this article is also related to a burgeoning empirical literature investi-
gating the effect of taxation on the international mobility of workers (Kleven et al.,
2013, 2014) which builds on a larger literature on tax induced mobility across local
jurisdictions (Shaw, 1986; Kirchgassner and Pommerehne, 1996; Bakija and Slem-
rod, 2004; Young and Varner, 2011).
Before proceeding, it is worth pointing out that maximizing tax revenues is
distinct from maximizing welfare. This article does not analyze the welfare impli-
cations of tax changes, nor does it consider strategic interactions between compet-
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ing fiscal authorities. The focus is on the impact of international migration on the
ability of governments to unilaterally raise tax revenue in the face of unrestricted
labor movements - a question of considerable practical interest.
The article proceeds as follows. In section 3.2, I discuss the simple two country
static model. In section 3.3, I analyze the consequences of international migration
on Laffer Curves within the European Union. I conclude in section 3.4.
3.2 Model
The world consists of a union of states and the rest of the world. Goods and capital
move freely both within the union and the rest of the world. Labor, however, may
only move freely within the union, which consists of two countries - Home and
Foreign. The N¯ workers in the union endogenously allocate themselves across
countries so that, at any given time, N workers reside in the Home country and
N∗ = N¯ − N reside in the Foreign country. Each country has an independent fiscal
authority which raises revenue through distortionary taxation by taxing capital
according to the source principle, and labor according to the residency principle.
Because each country operates the same production technology, and all workers
share the same preferences, I focus the model description below on the Home
country. Where necessary, however, I denote Foreign country variables with stars.
Consider a static model in which aggregate production Y is determined ac-
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cording to the following decreasing returns to scale production function1
Y =
(
KαL1−α
)χ
, χ < 1
where K is the total amount of capital stock employed in the Home country, L = Nl
is the total amount of effective labor input, l represents hours worked per worker,
α is the income share of capital, and χ determines the scale of diminishing returns.
I assume that these diseconomies of scale are external to each perfectly competi-
tive firm, which produces firm level output Y f according to Y f = AKαf L
1−α
f where
A = 1/(KαL1−α)1−χ is a function of aggregate stocks but is taken as given by firms.
Competitive input markets ensure that the pre-tax rate of return on capital r and
the wage per unit of effective labor w are equal to their respective marginal prod-
ucts
r =
∂Y f
∂K f
, w =
∂Y f
∂L f
(3.1)
The utility function of workers is given by
u = c − l
1+1/
1 + 1/
(3.2)
where c denotes consumption and  > 0 is the labor supply elasticity. The budget
constraint of each worker is
c = [(1 − I∗)(1 − τL)wl + I∗(1 − τL∗)w∗l∗] + (1 + r¯)k (3.3)
where k represents individual capital holdings and τL is the tax rate on labor in
the Home country. The indicator function I∗ indicates the residency decision of the
worker, and is equal to one when the individual chooses to reside in the Foreign
1Proposition 4 in Appendix C.4 demonstrates why the departure from constant returns is nec-
essary when all factors of production are mobile. See Binyamini and Razin (2008) and Rasmussen
(2013) for other examples of decreasing returns in the context of migration.
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country, in which case she earns an after tax wage of (1−τL∗)w∗. The world after tax
return on capital r¯ is taken as exogenous by the union members and is therefore
equivalent across each country due to the free movement of capital.
r¯ = r(1 − τK) = r∗(1 − τK∗) (3.4)
Individual utility maximization implies that labor supply is determined by
l = [w(1 − τL)] (3.5)
The indirect utility function of workers residing in the Home country V can there-
fore be stated as follows
V =
1
1 + 
[(1 − τL)w]1+ + (1 + r¯)k (3.6)
and free migration, which implies that V = V∗ implies that after tax real wages
must be equalized across countries according to Equation (3.7).
(1 − τL)w = (1 − τL∗)w∗ (3.7)
Finally, total government revenue, R, is the sum of taxes paid on capital and
labor income earned by the factors of production that are resident within that
country.
R = rKτK + wLτL (3.8)
3.3 Analysis
In this section, I estimate the impact of changes in capital and labor tax rates on
total tax revenue R. Conventional static scoring estimates assume that changes in
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tax rates do not impact national income or other macroeconomic variables. Static
estimates are therefore simply equal to the respective tax bases of each tax rate, as
demonstrated in Equations (3.9) and (3.10).
∂R
∂τL
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Static
= wL (3.9)
∂R
∂τK
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Static
= rK (3.10)
The actual change in tax revenues, however, will differ from these static esti-
mates. Dynamic estimates take into account the effect of the tax change on the
tax base. Equations (3.11) and (3.12) demonstrate that the model emits explicit
relationships between static and dynamic estimates of the effects of tax changes
on government revenue.2
∂R
∂τL
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dynamic
= (1 − ΘL) × ∂R
∂τL
∣∣∣∣
Static
(3.11)
∂R
∂τK
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dynamic
= (1 − ΘK) × ∂R
∂τK
∣∣∣∣
Static
(3.12)
where
ΘL =
χ(ατK + (1 − α)τL)
(1 − χα + (1 − χ))(1 − τL)
(
 +
1 − χα
1 − χ
N∗
N¯
)
(3.13)
ΘK =
χ(ατK + (1 − α)τL)
(1 − χα + (1 − χ))(1 − τK)
(
1 +  +
(1 − α)χ
1 − χ
N∗
N¯
)
(3.14)
ΘL and ΘK represent the respective percentages of a labor and capital tax cut
that pay for themselves. These terms are always positive, which means that the
dynamic feedback effects ensure that a tax cut always stimulates economic ac-
tivity in such a way as to reduce the full impact on government revenue that is
implied by static estimates. Each term is increasing in both the elasticity of labor
2Derivations of these equations can be found in Appendix C.3.
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, as well as the relative population size of the Foreign country N∗N¯ . A more elas-
tic intensive labor supply implies that labor responds more strongly to tax cuts,
thereby stimulating a higher level of the labor income tax base. This occurs for
reductions in the labor tax rate, which directly increases after tax wages, but also
for reductions in capital tax rates, which indirectly increases after tax wages via
an increase in the aggregate capital stock. See Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) for
a discussion of this well-understood point.3 A main contribution of this article is
to show that international migration flows further strengthens this channel. As
N∗
N¯ increases (a closed economy is represented by
N∗
N¯ = 0), there is a greater po-
tential pool of foreign labor that is attracted to the Home country by a tax cut.
The domestic labor supply therefore increases, which further softens the effect of
a tax cut on government revenues. International migration effectively introduces
an extensive margin of labor supply, thereby increasing the elasticity of total labor
supply with respect to changes in tax rates. Binyamini and Razin (2008) make this
point when demonstrating that international migration induces a flatter Phillips
Curve.
The values of six parameters (α, χ, , τK , τL, N∗N¯ ) are required to understand
the magnitude of these feedback effects. Following Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), I
calibrate the tax rates to match the average effective tax rates between 1995 and
2007 for 14 of the EU-15 countries (excluding Luxembourg) as well as the aggre-
gate EU-14 economy, which are presented in Table C.1. Average effective labor
tax rates varied from 27% in Ireland to 56% in Sweden with an EU-14 average of
41%. Average effective capital tax rates, on the other hand, were lower on average
3Equations (3.11) and (3.12) coincide with Equations (6) and (5) of Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006)
under equivalent assumptions (χ = 1,  = 0, N
∗
N¯ = 0). Note that constant returns to scale (χ = 1) is
appropriate in this case without migration. Using their calibration under a basic closed-economy
Ramsey model (α = 1/3, τK = τL = 1/4) yields identical results ( ∂R∂τK |Dynamic = 12 ∂R∂τK |Static).
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at 33% but varying from 16% in Greece to 51% in Denmark.
[Insert Table C.1 about here]
I also adopt the capital share of production of α = 0.38 found in Trabandt and
Uhlig (2011). The literature provides little guidance for the degree of diminishing
returns χ. In order to calibrate this parameter, I take a recent empirical finding by
Kleven et al. (2014), who exploited a natural experiment created by a preferential
foreigner tax scheme in Denmark to estimate a strikingly large elasticity of migra-
tion with respect to the net-of-tax rate of around 1.5. In the current model, this
implies that
αχ
1 − χ
N∗
N¯
≈ 1.5
which, assuming the two countries are of equal size (N∗N¯ = 0.5), yields a value of
χ = 0.9.4 The remaining parameter is the elasticity of labor supply . This value
is not only of central importance for the shape of the Laffer curve (Trabandt and
Uhlig, 2011), it is also the subject of a well known and ongoing academic debate.5
Rather than taking a stand on this debate, I perform all calculations under two
different labor supply elasticity assumptions. I choose the first ( = 0.5) to repre-
sent the building consensus on “micro estimates” (Bianchi et al., 2001; Pistaferri,
2003; Chetty et al., 2011) and the second ( = 1.5) to represent the mid point for
“macro estimates” (Prescott, 2004; Kimball and Shapiro, 2008).
Table C.2 presents the resulting self financing percentages for each country
under both labor supply elasticity assumptions. In order to capture the effect of
4In their investigation of European Laffer curves, Mendoza et al. (2014) use similar logic to cal-
ibrate an investment-adjustment-cost parameter by exploiting empirical estimates of the elasticity
of the capital tax base to changes in capital tax rates.
5See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2011) and Chetty et al. (2011) for a recent discussion.
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international migration on these estimates, I also present the results under the
assumption that international migration is completely restricted, in which case
population is fixed (N∗N¯ = 0), and under the assumption of free migration, in which
case the population is endogenously determined. Column 1 of Table C.2 shows
that labor tax cuts are at least partially self financing in all countries when labor
supply is relatively inelastic ( = 0.5) and migration is restricted. For the aggre-
gate EU-14 economy, the growth stimulated by a labor tax cut pays for 41% of the
static revenue loss, which means that static estimates overstate the reduction in
tax revenue by 59%. Shifting to a more elastic labor supply ( = 1.5), Column 2
shows that the self financing percentages all increase, as predicted by inspection
of the expressions in Equation (3.13) and (3.14), and in some cases become more
than fully self-financing. The EU-14, for example, has a self financing percent-
age of 107%. When the self-financing percentages are greater than 100, tax cuts
sufficiently stimulate activity so as to more than eliminate the static effect of a tax
cut. This corresponds to the downward sloping portion of the Laffer curve, which
will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.1. Columns 3 and 4 show that when
migration is unrestricted, labor tax cuts are more than fully self-financed for all
EU-14 countries. A reduction in labor taxes induces a sufficient amount of im-
migration to actually increase government revenue, even when labor supply is
relatively inelastic ( = 0.5).
[Insert Table C.2 about here]
Column 5 in Table C.2 shows that capital tax cuts would more than pay for
themselves in the majority of EU-14 countries even when migration is restricted
and labor supply is relatively inelastic. Under these assumptions, a capital tax cut
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in the aggregate EU-14 economy actually increases revenue by 8% of the decline
in revenue predicted by static estimates. Again, when labor is internationally
mobile, these figures increase, as the capital inflow induced by capital tax cuts
increases wages, thereby attracting foreign workers and raising the total supply
of labor.
The main point here is clear. Allowing for migration substantially increases the
scope for self financing tax cuts under current tax regimes. These self financing
percentages provide information regarding the slopes of their respective Laffer
curves at current tax rates. Therefore, free labor movement within the European
union implies that all European economies are on the downward sloping portion
of their respective Laffer curves. In the next sections I analyze these Laffer curves
in more detail.
3.3.1 Labor Tax Laffer Curve
The Laffer curve for labor income taxation in the aggregate EU-14 economy is
shown in Figure C.1. To obtain this plot, I varied labor taxes between 0% and
100% while holding all parameters and the capital tax rate constant at the EU-14
value of τk = 33%. For comparison purposes, total tax revenue is normalized to
100 at the calibrated labor tax rate of τL = 41%, as indicated by the solid vertical
line. Comparing first the solid and dashed red lines, which trace out the Laffer
curves under the assumption that there is no migration (N∗N¯ = 0), reveals that an
increase in the elasticity of labor supply shifts the peak of the Laffer curve to the
left. When labor supply is more responsive to changes in the after tax wage, rais-
ing revenue is more effective at lower tax rates. Indeed, the economy shifts from
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the upward sloping portion of the Laffer curve to the downward sloping portion
when  increases from 0.5 to 1.5, which is consistent with the self financing per-
centages shifting from below 100 (Column 1) to above 100 (Column 2) in Table
C.2.
[Insert Figure C.1 and Table C.3 about here]
Table C.3, which provides the results for the location and height of the Laffer
curve peak, confirms that the revenue maximizing tax rate in the EU-14 under the
 = 0.5 case is 66% (Column 2), which falls to 39% under the more elastic ( = 1.5)
case (Column 3). The government could increase total revenue by 13% under the
 = 0.5 case (Column 6) and by a negligible amount under the  = 1.5 case (Col-
umn 7). A similar story holds when comparing the solid and dashed black lines
in Figure C.1, which trace out the Laffer curves under the assumption that labor
is internationally mobile. According to Table C.3, when migration restrictions are
relaxed, the revenue maximizing labor tax rate falls from 28% (Column 4) to 24%
(Column 5) when  is increased.
By comparing the solid red and black curves, we see that allowing interna-
tional migration has a qualitatively similar effect to increasing the labor supply
elasticity, which is to shift the peak of the Laffer curve to the left. These visual
observations are formalized in Proposition 5 in Appendix C.4, which states that
the peak of the Laffer curve always shifts to the left when migration restrictions
are relaxed and when labor supply elasticities increase, provided the Laffer curve
peak is interior. Table C.3 shows that in the  = 0.5 case, the revenue maximizing
labor tax rate falls from 66% (Column 2) to 28% (Column 4) once migration re-
strictions are relaxed. Given that the actual tax rate is 41%, this also has the effect
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of shifting the economy from the upward sloping portion of the Laffer curve to
the downward sloping portion.
Looking down Table C.3 reveals that all EU-14 countries apart from Ireland
and Portugal are also on the downward sloping portion of the labour tax Laffer
curve when labor is internationally mobile. This means that for most EU-14 coun-
tries, labor tax cuts would more than pay for themselves. Comparing the values
in Column 2 with those in Columns 3 and 4 reveals that for all countries, the
presence of international migration is quantitatively more important than the la-
bor supply elasticity in determining the location of the Laffer curve peak, at least
within the range of elasticities considered here.
The amount of additional tax revenue that can be gained by switching to the
revenue maximizing tax rate (the peak of the Laffer curve) differs strikingly across
countries. Under the  = 0.5 case with no migration restrictions, for example,
Denmark stands to gain a 173% increase (Column 8) in tax revenues by lowering
its labor tax rate from 47% (Column 1) to 18% (Column 2). Greece, however, only
stands to gain a 4% increase in income after lowering its labor income tax rate from
41% to 35%. See Appendix C.5 for a graphical representation of the information
provided for individual countries in Table C.3.
3.3.2 Capital Tax Laffer Curve
The Laffer curve for capital income taxation in the aggregate EU-14 economy is
presented in Figure C.2. I obtain this plot in a similar manner to Figure C.1, but
this time varying the capital tax rate while holding the labor tax rate constant at
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τL = 41%. Like the labor tax Laffer curves, removing restrictions on migration and
increasing the labor supply elasticities shifts the peak of the Laffer curve leftward,
which is also demonstrated formally in Proposition 5. The EU-14 is situated on
the downward sloping portion of the capital tax Laffer curve under all migration
and labor supply elasticity assumptions. Table C.4 reveals that this is the case for
many of the individual countries as well. When there are no migration restric-
tions, every country except for Ireland is on the downward sloping portion of the
Laffer curve.
[Insert Figure C.2 and Table C.4 about here]
When comparing the revenue maximizing tax rates across the labor and capi-
tal tax Laffer curves (Tables C.3 and C.4), the peaks of the capital Laffer curves are
always located to the left of their labor counterparts. Indeed, Column 5 of Table
C.4 reveals that just 4 of the 14 individual countries maximize tax revenue at a
non zero value of τK when labor is mobile and relatively more elastic ( = 1.5).
Comparing Column 2 with Columns 3 and 4 reveals that international migration
is also quantitatively more important that the labor supply elasticity in determin-
ing the location of the capital tax Laffer curve. Finally, comparing Columns 8 and
9 across Tables C.3 and C.4 reveals that reductions in capital taxes provide more
scope than reductions in labor taxes to raise revenue. For example, when labor is
internationally mobile and inelastic ( = 0.5) (Column 8), the EU-14 can gain an
additional 30% of revenue through capital tax reductions whereas it can only gain
an additional 22% through labor tax reductions. See Appendix C.6 for a graphical
representation of the information provided for individual countries in Table C.3.
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3.4 Conclusion
This article is motivated by two central characteristics of the modern European
economy. The first is the unprecedented levels of sovereign debt, which have
prioritized the need for fiscal authorities to raise tax revenue. The second is the
freedom of labor movement enabled by the Maastricht Treaty. I argue that the
latter characteristic cannot be ignored when considering solutions to the first.
Specifically, I show within a static two country model that international mi-
gration is quantitatively more important than labor elasticities in determining the
position of the Laffer curve. Unrestricted migration increases the elasticity of to-
tal labor supply with respect to changes in the after tax wage by inducing cross
border movements of workers. The revenue maximizing tax rates for both labor
and capital are therefore reduced.
A simple calibration reveals that free labor mobility in Europe implies that
almost every economy in the EU-14 is located on the “slippery slope” of the labor
and capital tax Laffer curve. Thus, tax cuts are currently a viable avenue to raise
tax revenue in Europe.
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CHAPTER 4
THE EFFECT OF TAX EXPENDITURES ON AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS:
METHODS AND EVIDENCE
4.1 Introduction
The federal government “spends” through the tax code by exempting certain eco-
nomic activities from taxation. Research has examined how these “tax expendi-
tures” affect individual behavior (Hilber and Turner, 2014) and how the benefits
of such tax expenditures are unequally distributed across income groups (Burman
et al., 2008). We broaden these insights by examining tax expenditures within the
wider context of the federal tax system. In particular, we investigate how tax ex-
penditures affect the ability of the tax system to stabilize household disposable
income and consumption.
The income tax system reduces fluctuations in disposable income by partially
absorbing shocks to market income. Tax expenditures may distort this ability of
the tax system to function as an automatic stabilizer. In this article, we measure
these distortions. We propose a method to estimate the effect of a tax expenditure
on the ability of the tax system to act as an automatic stabilizer. In developing this
method, we exploit underlying theoretical links we identify between measures of
the automatic stabilizing power of a tax system, the size of tax expenditures, and
effective marginal tax rates (EMTR).
We measure the automatic stabilization of disposable income using the Nor-
malized Tax Change (NTC) (Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000), which captures how
much aggregate tax revenue changes in response to a change in aggregate market
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income (Slitor, 1948). To measure how a tax expenditure affects the automatic sta-
bilization of disposable income, we estimate the change in the NTC induced by
the removal of the provision. This change, which we call the NTC Shifter (NTCS),
measures the destabilizing effect of a tax expenditure on disposable income. We
show that the NTCS can be interpreted as (1) the extra proportion of a fluctuation
in market income that would be absorbed by the tax system in the absence of the
tax expenditure, (2) the sensitivity of the tax expenditure to income changes, or
(3) the sensitivity of the EMTR to the removal of the tax expenditure.
Automatic stabilizers deal with business cycle fluctuations, which are in-
herently transitory. Because consumption of rational agents depends on
permanent—not transitory—income, the effect of tax expenditures on dispos-
able income stabilization must be translated into demand stabilization by adjust-
ing for each household’s marginal propensity to consume (MPC). To estimate
demand stabilization, we adopt the standard assumption that Hand-to-Mouth
(HtM) households have a MPC equal to one, while all other households have a
zero MPC (Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000; Dolls et al., 2012). The MPC Adjusted
NTC (ANTC) measures how much aggregate tax revenue that would have otherwise
been spent changes in response to a change in aggregate market income.
We define our empirical measure of the effect of a tax expenditure on auto-
matic stabilization as the change in the ANTC induced by the removal of the pro-
vision. This measure, which we call the ANTC Shifter (ANTCS), estimates the
extra amount of consumption, as a proportion of a fluctuation in market income,
that the tax system would absorb in the absence of the tax provision.
Using microdata from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) from 1988 to
2009, we find evidence that two of the largest tax expenditures—the Mortgage
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Interest Deduction (MID) and the Charitable Contributions Deduction (CCD)—
alter the federal tax system’s role as an automatic stabilizer. The MID and CCD
decreased the ability of the tax system to absorb fluctuations in aggregate con-
sumption by an average of 4.92% and 4.20%, respectively. These estimates tell
us how much the tax provisions change the relative ability of the tax system to
absorb consumption.
In order to interpret the findings in terms of how a tax provision changes
the sensitivity of consumption to income fluctuations, which is the policy rele-
vant measure that can be compared to equivalent measurements from the con-
sumption response literature (Kniesner and Ziliak, 2002), we must normalize the
ANTCS by the baseline sensitivity of consumption to income fluctuations (Kingi
and Rozema, 2015). This normalized measure estimates the increase in the reac-
tion of consumption to income changes caused by the tax provision. We find that
the MID and CCD increased the sensitivity of consumption to income fluctuations
from a baseline of 0.14 by 1.13% and 0.97%, respectively. A back of the envelope
calculation suggests that, in light of a 3% recession, the removal of the MID and
CCD would have been to stabilize annual consumption by an average of $3.5 and
$3.1 billion (in 2012 dollars), respectively. The MID and CCD substantially de-
crease the tax system’s ability to stabilize demand.
The attractiveness of a tax expenditure, both politically and as a means to in-
crease social welfare, is rarely analyzed in light of its relationship with the general
stabilizing effect of the federal tax system (Listokin, 2012). It is our view that the
assessment of the desirability of a tax expenditure ought to take this relationship
into account. An important part of this assessment lies in knowing the magnitude
of the change in automatic stabilization caused by a tax expenditure. Our paper
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makes a first attempt at measuring this.
We make two contributions. First, we consolidate concepts of automatic stabi-
lizers, effective marginal tax rates, and tax expenditures into a single theoretical
framework. Our main contribution is to exploit this framework to propose and
implement a method for estimating the effect of a tax expenditure on the ability
of the tax system to act as an automatic stabilizer. In addition to microsimulation
techniques from the automatic stabilization literature (Auerbach and Feenberg,
2000; Dolls et al., 2012), our empirical approach incorporates techniques used to
estimate the size of tax expenditures (Poterba and Sinai, 2011) and the methods
used to estimate changes in the EMTR (Barro and Sahasakul, 1983; Saez, 2004;
Mertens and Ravn, 2013). We show that changes in the NTC can be explicitly
expressed in terms of tax expenditures and of changes in the EMTR. These links
justify our empirical method for estimating the destabilizing effect of a tax expen-
diture.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 sets out the theoretical framework
behind our analysis. We develop our empirical methodology in Section 4.3. In
Section 4.3.1, we propose our empirical measure of the effect of a tax expenditure
on the ability of the tax system to act as an automatic stabilizer and discuss the
complications that arise in estimating this measure. In Section 4.3.2, we derive the
connection between the NTC and the EMTR, and introduce a new formula that
encompasses both of these concepts. Section 4.3.3 demonstrates the key concepts
of how tax expenditures can influence automatic stabilizers through simple nu-
merical examples. Section 4.4 describes the data and the channels through which
tax expenditures can influence stabilization. Section 4.5 presents our results and
Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 Theoretical Framework
4.2.1 Literature Review
Our research lies at the intersection of the literatures on automatic stabilizers and
tax expenditures. The income tax system functions as an automatic stabilizer by
partially absorbing shocks to market income. Theoretical work on automatic sta-
bilizers began with Musgrave and Miller (1948) and Slitor (1948). Empirical work
that measures the size of automatic stabilizers can be divided into micro and
macro studies. Our work is closely related to micro studies. These studies apply
microsimulation techniques to overcome the main limitation of endogenous ag-
gregate measures of stabilization used in macro studies (Auerbach and Feenberg,
2000; Auerbach, 2009; Dolls et al., 2012), such as the ratio of tax revenue and GDP
(International Monetary Fund, 2009), the cyclical elasticity of tax system compo-
nents with respect to income (van den Noord, 2000; Fatas and Mihov, 2012), and
the relationship between government size and output volatility (Gali, 1994; Fatas
and Mihov, 2001). Unlike macro approaches using these aggregate-level mea-
sures, microsimulation is able to isolate the effects of automatic stabilizers from
behavioral and general equilibrium effects.
The tax system functions as an automatic stabilizer through at least three chan-
nels. First, workers are incentivized to substitute work effort away from booms
and into recessions when faced with tax rates that rise in expansionary periods
and fall in recessionary periods (Christiano, 1984). Second, if low income house-
holds have higher propensities to spend than high income households, redistribu-
tion from high to low-income households means that aggregate consumption will
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rise with redistribution during recessions (Blinder, 1975). Finally, the tax system
absorbs fluctuations in market income directly.
We focus on the latter aspect of automatic stabilizers. To do this, we use the
concept of a tax system’s “built-in flexibility” introduced by Slitor (1948), which
says that an income tax system dampens the variability of disposable income
and therefore provides insurance against market income volatility (Musgrave and
Miller, 1948; Brown, 1955; Brown and Kruizenga, 1959; Cohen, 1959; Pechman,
1973). Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) proposed a microsimulation strategy to es-
timate built-in flexibility. To construct an empirical measure of built-in flexibility,
Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) simulate a 1% change in aggregate income spread
neutrally across the population, and estimate tax liability for each tax filer be-
fore and after the hypothetical income increase. Auerbach and Feenberg (2000)
measure built-in flexibility by estimating the Normalized Tax Change (NTC) ac-
cording to Equation (4.1).
NTC =
∑
i
(
Tˆi − Ti
)
∑
i
(
Yˆi − Yi
) (4.1)
where Tˆi is the amount of tax paid by tax filer i after the hypothetical increase in
income from Yi to Yˆi and Ti was the actual amount of tax paid by tax filer i. The
NTC measures the degree to which total tax revenue fluctuates with income.
4.2.2 MPC Adjustment
In order for aggregate demand to be stabilized, the cushioning effect of taxes on
disposable income must be translated into a cushioning effect on household con-
sumption, the primary component of aggregate demand. A high reaction of con-
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sumption to transitory changes in current disposable income is inconsistent with
rational, forward-looking behavior which implies that current demand should
depend on some permanent income concept (Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000). In
other words, without HtM households with nonzero MPCs, automatic stabilizers
would not impact current demand.
To analyze demand stabilization, we adopt the approach of Auerbach and
Feenberg (2000) and Dolls et al. (2012) who assume that HtM households fully
adjust consumption after changes in disposable income (MPC = 1) while non-
HtM households do not adjust consumption at all (MPC = 0). The MPC Adjusted
NTC (ANTC) is estimated according to Equation (4.2).
ANTC =
∑
i∈HtM
(
Tˆi − Ti
)
∑
i
(
Yˆi − Yi
) (4.2)
where HtM is the subset of HtM households. The ANTC measures the change
in aggregate taxes that would have otherwise been spent in response to, and as a
proportion of, changes in market income.
4.3 Empirical Methodology
4.3.1 Measuring the Stabilizing Effect of a Tax Expenditure
We estimate the effect of tax expenditure X on the tax system’s ability to stabilize
disposable income and consumption by estimating its impact on the NTC and
ANTC, respectively. Specifically, for tax expenditure X we define the NTC Shifter
(NTCS) according to Equation (4.3) and the ANTC Shifter (ANTCS) according to
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Equation (4.4).
NTCSX = ˜NTCX=0 −NTC (4.3)
ANTCSX = ˜ANTCX=0 −ANTC (4.4)
where ˜NTCX=0 and ˜ANTCX=0 are the estimated NTC and ANTC in a counterfac-
tual world without tax provision X and with tax credits held constant, respec-
tively. The value of NTCSX gives the extra proportion of a fluctuation in market
income that would be absorbed by the tax system in the absence of tax provision
X. The value of ANTCSX gives the extra amount of consumption, as a proportion
of a fluctuation in market income, that the tax system would have absorbed in the
absence of tax provision X.
It is worth emphasizing what exactly our estimators capture and how the es-
timates should be interpreted. The microsimulation used to derive the estimators
is designed to assess the sensitivity of consumption to potential changes in income
(Auerbach and Feenberg, 2000), which, importantly, is precisely what automatic
stabilizers deal with.
The main complication that arises in this exercise lies within the assumptions
made regarding the counterfactual world in which the tax provision no longer
exists. This complication is exactly the well-known complication faced when at-
tempting to estimate tax expenditures (Burman, 2003; Altshuler and Dietz, 2011;
Poterba, 2011), as we will show below. We therefore briefly discuss the compli-
cation that arises within our method and how we address it in the more familiar
setting of how it relates to tax expenditure estimation.
Unlike direct expenditures, tax expenditures cannot be measured using stan-
dard accounting methods. Estimating the expenditure from a tax provision in-
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stead amounts to estimating the change in federal income tax revenue caused by
the hypothetical elimination of a provision in the tax code. The complication in
estimating tax expenditures is that the estimates are “static,” meaning the exercise
assumes that the hypothetical elimination of the tax provision does not influence
economic behavior. On the one hand, this is a strong assumption, given that many
tax expenditures are precisely designed to alter economic behavior. MID tax ex-
penditure estimates are likely to differ from the amount of revenue that would
be gained by eliminating the MID provision (Burman et al., 2008). A substantial
literature examines changes in portfolio adjustments that are likely to result from
the elimination of the MID (Poterba, 1984; Berkovec and Fullerton, 1992; Jones,
1995; Follain and Melamed, 1998; Dunsky and Follain, 2000; Amromin et al., 2007;
Gale et al., 2007; Gervais and Pandey, 2008; Poterba and Sinai, 2008). Poterba and
Sinai (2011) estimate that repealing the MID in 2003 would have raised income tax
revenues by $72.4 billion in the absence of any household portfolio adjustments,
but by $58.5 billion if homeowners drew down financial assets to pay down their
mortgage debt.
On the other hand, the alternative assumption of optimal household portfolio
reallocation that is required to overcome the limitations of the static estimates is
perhaps an even stronger assumption. Like Poterba and Sinai (2011), we find that
many households could reduce their tax burden by modifying their asset portfo-
lio, implying that households are not optimizing. Rather than taking a stand on
issues of asset portfolio allocation, we simply follow the tax expenditure literature
and use static estimates (Burman, 2003; Altshuler and Dietz, 2011; Poterba, 2011).
In the case of the CCD, however, the static assumption has little to no effect on
our estimator for stability. This is because charitable giving decisions are expen-
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diture decisions rather than asset allocation decisions and therefore any change
in behavior induced by removing the CCD is unlikely to alter personal income.
In other words, the removal of the CCD simply makes the consumption good of
charitable giving more expensive.
With this complication in mind, consider the procedure for estimating tax ex-
penditures. It consists of running tax filers through a tax calculator under the
baseline normal tax structure with and without the tax provision and comparing
tax revenues. More formally, the tax expenditure of tax provision X, EX, is esti-
mated according to Equation (4.5).
EX =
∑
i
(
T X=0i − Ti
)
(4.5)
where T X=0i is the tax liability of tax filer i in the counterfactual world without tax
provision X, and Ti is the actual amount of tax liability for tax filer i.
With this definition in hand, we can be more explicit about the relationship be-
tween the NTCS and tax expenditures. The NTCS can be expressed as a function
of two types of tax expenditures according to Equation (4.6).
NTCSX =
EˆX − EX∑
i
(
Yˆi − Yi
) (4.6)
where EˆX is the estimated tax expenditure on provision X in a counterfactual sce-
nario with a 1% increase in income for each tax filer and with tax credits held
constant. Equation (4.6) demonstrates that a tax expenditure that is highly sen-
sitive to changes in income has a larger effect on stabilization. Our measure can
therefore be alternatively interpreted as the sensitivity of tax expenditures to in-
come changes.
In the next section, we set forth a general concept of the economy-wide
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marginal tax rate, and show how the NTCS can also be interpreted as the sen-
sitivity of the EMTR to the removal of the tax expenditure.
4.3.2 Weighted Average Marginal Tax Rates
Slitor (1948) noted that built-in flexibility (the NTC) is related to the concept of
EMTR, which is now used in the macroeconomics literature on the response of ag-
gregate economic activity to changes in marginal tax rates (Barro and Sahasakul,
1983; Saez, 2004; Mertens and Ravn, 2013). To our knowledge, the mathematical
relationship between the NTC and the EMTR has not been formally articulated.
Equation (4.7) lays out a concept we refer to as the Weighted Average Marginal
Tax Rate (WAMTR), which embeds the NTC and EMTR as special cases.
WAMTR =
∑
i
ωi
(
Tˆi − Ti
∆i
)
(4.7)
where Tˆi is the amount of tax paid by tax filer i after a hypothetical increase in
income by ∆i, and ωi is the weight attributed to tax filer i. The difference between
the NTC and the EMTR amounts to differences in the assumed size of the income
change ∆i when numerically constructing the marginal tax rates of each tax filer,
where both use income weights (ωi = Yi∑
i Yi
). The NTC is estimated using a 1%
change in income (∆i = 0.01Yi); the EMTR is estimated using a marginal change in
income (∆i = $1).
The exercise of estimating the NTCS and ANTCS is therefore very similar to es-
timating changes in the EMTR common in the business cycle literature (Barro and
Sahasakul, 1983). Rather than measuring the effect of marginal income changes
on a version of the WAMTR as in the macro literature (specifically, where the
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WAMTR is the EMTR), we measure the effect of whole tax provisions on a ver-
sion of the WAMTR (specifically, where the WAMTR is the NTC). The NTCS can
therefore be interpreted as the sensitivity of the WAMTR to the removal of the tax
provision.
Before we turn to the empirical section, we present simple numerical examples
to illustrate the economic intuition of how tax expenditures can impact automatic
stabilizers.
4.3.3 Numerical Examples
All the examples we present feature an economy with two tax brackets and two
tax filers. The tax system is characterized by marginal tax rates of 10% and 20%
with an income threshold of $10,000. We denote the gross income of tax filer 1
and 2 by Y1 and Y2, respectively. Unless stated otherwise, we follow the notation
in the previous sections.
Example 3 (Base Case). Y1 = $8, 000, Y2 = $12, 000
T1 = $8, 000 × 0.10 = $800, Tˆ1 = $8, 000 × 1.01 × 0.10 = $808
T2 = $10, 000 × 0.10 + ($12, 000 − $10, 000) × 0.20 = $1, 400
Tˆ2 = $10, 000 × 0.10 + ($12, 000 × 1.01 − $10, 000) × 0.20 = $1, 424
NTC =
($808 − $800) + ($1, 424 − $1, 400)
($8, 080 − $8, 000) + ($12, 120 − $12, 000) = 0.16
EMTR = 0.1 × $8, 000
$20, 000
+ 0.2 × $12, 000
$20, 000
= 0.16
Example 3 first outlines the calculation of tax liabilities before (Ti) and after (Tˆi)
the hypothetical 1% increase in income. Using these tax liabilities, we calculate the
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NTC using Equation (4.1) and the EMTR by summing over the income-weighted
marginal tax rates.
In this example, the NTC and the EMTR coincide because the 1% income in-
crease used to calculate the NTC does not push tax filer 1 into a higher tax bracket.
Therefore, the relevant increase in tax revenue as a percent of income coincides
with the marginal tax rates faced by each tax filer. In the next example, we allow
for a $1,000 lump sum deduction from taxable income.
Example 4 (Tax Deduction). Y1 = $8, 000, Y2 = $12, 000, lump-sum deduction =
$1, 000
T1 = $700, Tˆ1 = $708, T2 = $1, 200, Tˆ2 = $1, 224
NTC = 0.16, EMTR = 0.16
T X=01 = $800, Tˆ
X=0
1 = $808, T
X=0
2 = $1, 400, Tˆ
X=0
2 = $1, 424
E = ($800 − $700) + ($1, 400 − $1, 200) = $300
Eˆ = ($808 − $708) + ($1, 424 − $1, 224) = $300
Example 4 shows that this tax deduction has no effect on the NTC. This sur-
prising result is a consequence of the fact that the deduction in this example does
not depend on income and is not sufficiently large as to induce the movement of
tax filers across tax brackets.
Using Equation (4.5) to estimate tax expenditures, we subtract the actual tax
revenue raised with the hypothetical amount of taxes raised in a world without
the deduction to calculate E = $300. Repeating this exercise under the counter-
factual scenario of a 1% increase in income (Eˆ), tax expenditures do not change.
This is consistent with Equation (4.6) because an unchanged level of tax expendi-
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tures implies an unchanged value of the NTC. In the next two examples, we relax
the properties that the tax deduction does not induce bracket shifting (Example 5)
and that it does not depend on income (Example 6).
Example 5 (Bracket Shifting Deduction). Y1 = $8, 000, Y2 = $12, 000, lump-sum
deduction = $3, 000
T1 = $500, Tˆ1 = $508, T2 = $900, Tˆ2 = $912
NTC = 0.10, EMTR = 0.10, E = 800, Eˆ = 812
Example 5 demonstrates that the NTC is reduced when a tax deduction al-
lows tax filer 2 to occupy the lower tax bracket. The impact of tax deductions on
the stabilizing ability of the tax system depends on the extent to which the de-
ductions induce “bracket shift.” Bracket shifting depends on the size of the tax
deduction, the number of tax brackets, and the extent to which tax filers are dis-
tributed closely to the tax bracket thresholds. Specifically, more bracket shifting
occurs with larger tax deductions, more tax brackets, and more tax filers clustered
around tax bracket thresholds.
Moving our attention toward tax expenditure estimation, we observe that a tax
regime with a larger deduction will have higher tax expenditures. Furthermore,
the tax expenditure in the counterfactual scenario with a 1% increase in income,
Eˆ, is now larger because tax filer 2 would witness a higher marginal tax rate in the
world without the tax expenditure. We can also confirm the important relation-
ship in Equation (4.6) which shows that the value of the NTCS = (0.16−0.10) = 0.06
can be expressed in terms of tax expenditure estimates:
NTCS =
$812 − $800
($8, 080 − $8, 000) + ($12, 120 − $12, 000) = 0.06
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In the next example, we consider the situation where the deduction is depen-
dent on income. In particular, we assume that the deduction is a fixed percentage
of income so that any change in income causes a proportional change in the de-
duction.
Example 6 (Income-Dependent Tax Deduction). Y1 = $8, 000, Y2 = $12, 000, de-
duction = 12.5% × Yi
T1 = $700, Tˆ1 = $707, T2 = $1, 100, Tˆ2 = $1, 121
NTC = 0.14, EMTR = 0.16, E = $300, Eˆ = $303
Example 6 demonstrates that a tax deduction which is an increasing function
of income reduces the NTC, even without bracket shifting. The tax system is un-
able to absorb as large a proportion of income when income is increased, because
that income increase is accompanied by an increase in the tax deduction.
We next consider the case with no explicit tax deduction, but where tax filer
1 is sufficiently close to the income threshold that a 1% income increase changes
her tax bracket.
Example 7 (Bracket Creep). Y1 = $9, 950, Y2 = $12, 000
T1 = $995, Tˆ1 = $1010, T2 = $1, 400, Tˆ2 = $1, 424
NTC = 0.178, EMTR = 0.155
Example 7, when compared to Example 3, demonstrates that the NTC in-
creases when tax filer 1 is sufficiently close to the income tax threshold that a
1% increase in income triggers a change in her marginal tax rate. The economy
is better able to absorb fluctuations in income when those fluctuations induce
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“bracket creep.” Because part of the incremental income is taxed at a higher rate,
bracket creep diminishes the impact of the income change on disposable income.
This occurs despite the fall in the EMTR, which is a result of a larger share of the
economy’s income being held by tax filer 1 who faces a lower marginal tax rate.
The stabilizing effect of bracket creep resulting from an increase in income has the
potential to offset the destabilizing effect of bracket shifting induced by tax de-
ductions. Finally, we demonstrate the properties of the ANTC by assuming that
tax filer 1 is HtM.
Example 8 (MPC Adjustment). Y1 = $8, 000 (HtM), Y2 = $12, 000
T1 = $800, Tˆ1 = $808, T2 = $1, 400, Tˆ2 = $1, 424
NTC = 0.16, EMTR = 0.16
ANTC =
($808 − $800)
($8, 080 − $80, 00) + ($12, 120 − $12, 000) = 0.04
The ANTC is always less than the NTC because the ANTC only depends on
changes in taxes of HtM tax filers, which is by definition less than total changes
in taxes. Unless every tax filer is HtM, the NTC will therefore overestimate the
cushioning effect of the tax system.
Through these examples, we hoped to build intuition for the NTCS and
ANTCS. In the next section, we describe the data and present the workings of
the MID and CCD. In doing so, we will discuss how the intuition presented here
relates to each of these provisions.
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4.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We estimate the destabilizing effect of the MID and CCD using data from the Sur-
vey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF is a nationally representative triennial
survey of U.S. households conducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System in cooperation with the Statistics of Income Division (SOI) of the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The SCF collects information on a broad array of
assets, liabilities, and related information on items such as interest rates on loans.
Notably, it contains information on the amount of mortgage holdings and appli-
cable interest rates as well as on charitable contributions. In addition, the survey
collects information on household demographics that are important for the esti-
mation of federal income tax liability, including information on wage and capital
income, number of dependents, and marital status.
We investigate the impact of the MID and CCD on automatic stabilizers for
the years 1988 to 2009. The MID and CCD have unique characteristics and have
differed in their respective historical prominence. In the following subsections,
we briefly describe them. For the purpose of demonstrating how each policy can
impact stabilization, we present some basic descriptive evidence from the SCF
and, at times, from aggregate administrative data from the IRS SOI.
4.4.1 Mortgage Interest Deduction
The MID allows tax filers to reduce their taxable income by the amount of interest
paid on home mortgages. Given that more than $300 billion in mortgage interest
payments were made in 2012, the MID provides significant potential tax savings
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for homeowners. However, because the MID is an itemized deduction, it is not
necessarily the case that all mortgage interest paid is technically eligible as a tax
write off.
The MID reduces taxable income so that its primary effect will be to dimin-
ish the stabilizing effect of the tax system. The stabilizing effect of the MID, as
demonstrated in Examples 4 and 5, depends on the extent to which it lowers the
marginal tax rate faced by tax filers. This in turn depends on the extent to which
tax filers are clustered around the marginal tax rate thresholds (and are therefore
vulnerable to MID-induced bracket shifting).
Figure D.1 demonstrates how itemizers and MID claimants are distributed
across income groups. It shows the average percentage of tax filers who item-
ize deductions (left) and the average percentage of all tax filers who claim the
MID (right) broken down by income from 1980-2012 (in $2012), where the confi-
dence bars indicate +/- one standard deviation for the particular income group
over time. The increasing popularity of the MID across a wide range of the in-
come distribution beyond $40,000 indicates that the MID is likely to cause at least
some bracket shifting.
[Insert Figure D.1 about here]
4.4.2 Charitable Contributions Deduction
The deduction for charitable contributions is one of the oldest tax provisions. It
was added to the tax code by the War Revenue Act of 1917, when income tax
rates were sharply raised to pay for World War I. The concern was that raising
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the top rate from 15% to 67% would deprive tax filers of the disposable income
from which they had been making charitable contributions. Like the MID, the
CCD is an itemized deduction, so it allows tax payers who itemize deductions to
reduce their taxable income by the amount paid for gifts to certain organizations
with charitable status. Thus, the stabilization mechanisms relating to the MID are
also at work in the CCD. We therefore expect the CCD to decrease the stabilizing
ability of the tax system.
The left hand panel of Figure D.2 plots the number of tax filers claiming the
CCD and the total amount of tax filer spending on charities over time. Since 1980,
CCD-eligible spending has increased from under $50 billion to $200 billion per
year (in $2012). The right hand panel of Figure D.2 shows annual average aggre-
gate charitable giving broken down by income, where the confidence bars indi-
cate +/- one standard deviation for the income group (in $2012). Aggregate giv-
ing captures both the average giving per tax filer and the distribution of tax filers
across income groups. Unlike the top income groups, the largest group of aggre-
gate givers—the $100,000 to $200,000 income group—is subject to bracket shifting.
This is important because the destabilizing effects of the CCD work through the
extent to which it lowers marginal tax rates via bracket shifting.
[Insert Figure D.2 about here]
4.5 Results
We estimate the NTC by running the SCF microdata through TAXSIM—the
NBER’s microsimulation tax model—to estimate each tax filer’s tax liability with
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actual income and again after increasing all income items by 1%. Using the ac-
tual and counterfactual tax liabilities, we calculate the NTC according to Equation
(4.1). To translate these estimates into MPC adjusted estimates that are relevant
for demand stabilization, we identified HtM tax filers following the approach in
Kaplan and Violante (2014). We leave a short discussion of this procedure and
some of the benefits of this approach over other approaches for the Appendix.
Figure D.3 shows the proportion of HtM tax filers and the median income of
HtM tax filers over time. Both the proportion of HtM tax filers and median income
of HtM tax filers have remained fairly stable at around 28% and $30k, respectively.
Because HtM tax filers make up less than 30% of the population (and a likely
lower proportion of aggregate income, as indicated in Example 8), we expect the
change in aggregate tax revenue that is relevant for stabilizing aggregate demand
(ANTC) to be substantially less than the change in aggregate tax revenue (NTC).
[Insert Figure D.3 about here]
Table D.1 in the Appendix provides the results that we will now describe. We
find that the tax system absorbed 25.4% of fluctuations in market income (the
NTC), 3.7ppt of which would have otherwise been spent (the ANTC).1 Finally,
we conduct the counterfactual simulations in which we remove each of the tax
provisions of interest, and estimate the NTCSX and ANTCSX for the MID and
CCD. In the case of the MID, for example, we set each tax filer’s mortgage interest
paid to zero, estimate NTCMID=0 and ANTCMID=0, and then use these estimates
1See Dolls et al. (2012) for a discussion on how ANTC estimates significantly depend on the par-
ticular HtM definition employed, which can explain differences in the magnitudes of our ANTC
estimates and the equivalent series produced by Auerbach and Feenberg (2000). See Kingi and
Rozema (2015) for empirical evidence on this issue.
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to estimate the NTCSMID and ANTCSMID according to Equations (4.3) and (4.4).
Figure D.4 plots our yearly NTCS and ANTCS estimates. On average between
1988 and 2009, the value of the NTCS for the MID and CCD was 50.2 and 38.2
basis points, respectively. This means that, on average, the MID and the CCD
decreased the absorption effect of the tax system on disposable income by 1.98%
(0.00502/0.254) and 1.50% (0.00382/0.254), respectively. The magnitudes of the
effects of the tax expenditures on the ANTCS are smaller in absolute terms, but
larger in relative terms. The average values of the ANTCS for the MID and CCD
were 18.2 and 15.5 basis points, respectively. This means that the effect of the
MID and CCD was to decrease the tax system’s ability to absorb fluctuations in
consumption by 4.92% (0.00182/0.037) and 4.20% (0.00155/0.037), respectively.
[Insert Figure D.4 about here]
These are relative estimates that say how much the tax system’s automatic sta-
bilizers are affected by the tax expenditure. However, because the effectiveness
of the tax system in stabilizing the sensitivity of consumption to changes in mar-
ket income is the measure of interest in the design of the tax system’s automatic
stabilizers, these relative estimates are not directly relevant to policy making. For
example, our estimates imply a much larger destabilizing effect for an initial con-
sumption sensitivity of 10% as opposed to, say, 50%.
We therefore normalize our estimates by the sensitivity of consumption to
market income fluctuations in the absence of a tax system. As pointed out by
Kingi and Rozema (2015), normalizing the ANTC in this manner reveals the ex-
tent to which the tax system as a whole reduces the response of consumption to
market income changes. By normalizing the ANTCS, we reveal how a tax expen-
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diture alters the ability of the tax system to reduce the sensitivity of consumption
with respect to market income changes, which can be directly compared to equiv-
alent measurements from the consumption response literature (Kniesner and Zil-
iak, 2002). These adjusted measures are ultimately of interest for policy makers
not only in the design of tax expenditure and automatic stabilization policies, but
also for the design of discretionary stabilization policies that target the residual
fluctuations left over after the built-in stabilizers.
Figure D.5 plots our yearly adjusted estimates. We find that, on average, the
MID and CCD increased the sensitivity of consumption to income fluctuations
by 1.13% and 0.97%, respectively. To convert these changes in the sensitivity of
consumption to dollar values, one needs to first impose a counterfactual business
cycle fluctuation by assuming a size of the change in income. The eleven U.S. re-
cessions in the post war period have witnessed drops in Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) from as small as under 0.5% to as large as 5.1% (in 2008), with five reces-
sions witnessing a drop between 2% and 4% (Federal Reserve Bank, 2015). To be
able to compare the destabilizing effect of the tax expenditures with the stabiliz-
ing effect of enacted discretionary stabilizing policies that do not usually occur in
mild recessions (e.g., tax rebates), we base our back of the envelope calculations
on a somewhat severe 3% recession.2
Using the annual total personal income in the U.S., which was on average $10
trillion (in $2012) (row 7 of Table D.1), a 3% recession leads to an average annual
reduction in personal income of $0.3 trillion (in $2012). Given the estimated con-
sumption sensitivity in the presence of the tax system (on average, 13.5%, row 9 of
2Recessions are defined with respect to reductions in GDP rather than personal income subject
to federal taxes. However, we follow Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) in assuming that a change
in GDP is reflected in an identical change in aggregate personal income spread evenly across the
population.
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Table D.1), consumption in the recession therefore falls, on average, by $40.5 bil-
lion (in $2012). However, in the absence of the MID (CCD), consumption would
have only fallen, on average, by $37.0 billion ($37.4 billion) (in $2012).3 Impor-
tantly, the difference between the fall in consumption with and without the tax
provision is exactly equal to the ANTCS multiplied by the change in total per-
sonal income, which highlights the appeal of our estimator. We calculate that the
removal the MID (CCD) in light of a 3% recession would yield an average $3.5
billion ($3.1 billion) injection of consumption automatically into the economy (in
$2012).
[Insert Figure D.5 about here]
To contextualize the magnitude of these estimates in terms of the size of dis-
cretionary stabilization policies, consider the 2001 tax rebate, which has been esti-
mated to have increased aggregate consumption by $31.6 billion (in $2012) (John-
son et al., 2006). Our back of the envelope calculation therefore suggests that the
removal of the MID and CCD would have stabilized consumption by about 11.1%
($3.5 billion/$31.6 billion) and 9.8% ($3.1 billion/$31.6 billion) of the change in
consumption induced by the 2001 tax rebate, respectively.
4.6 Conclusion
One goal of the U.S. federal income tax system is to encourage particular economic
activities by exempting them from taxation. Another is to automatically reduce
3The monetary change in consumption without a tax provision is calculated by the product of
the consumption sensitivity in the presence of the tax system but in the absence of the tax provision
and the change in total personal income.
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fluctuations in the aggregate economy. Most assessments of the merits of tax ex-
penditures have ignored their intrinsic relationship with automatic stabilization.
In this article, we examine the interaction of these goals and show how measures
of automatic stability relate to existing measures of tax expenditures and effective
marginal tax rates.
We make two contributions. First, we consolidate concepts of automatic sta-
bilizers, effective marginal tax rates, and tax expenditures into a single theoreti-
cal framework. Our main contribution is to exploit this framework to propose a
method for estimating the effect of a tax expenditure on the ability of the tax sys-
tem to act as an automatic stabilizer and estimate this measure using the Survey
of Consumer Finances.
From 1988 to 2009, the Mortgage Interest Deduction (MID) and the Charita-
ble Contributions Deduction (CCD) decreased the ability of the tax system to ab-
sorb fluctuations in income by an average of 4.92% and 4.20%, which increased
the sensitivity of consumption to income fluctuations from a baseline of 0.14 by
1.13% and 0.97%, respectively. A back of the envelope calculation suggests that,
in light of a 3% recession, the removal of the MID and CCD would have been to
stabilize annual consumption by about an average of $3.5 and $3.1 billion (in 2012
dollars). Our findings suggest that, even relative to the size of discretionary stabi-
lization policies, the MID and CCD substantially decrease the tax system’s ability
to stabilize demand.
It is our view that the desirability of tax expenditures ought to be assessed
within the wider context of the income tax system. Our estimator speaks to the
total effect of a tax expenditure on automatic stabilization. However, our methods
are applicable to the analysis of any future tax reform proposal, whether it be the
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repeal of a current provision, the enactment of a new provision, or a modification
of a prevailing provision. Instead of the hypothetical elimination of a tax pro-
vision to measure its stabilizing effect as we did here, the policy analyst simply
conducts a simulation where the counterfactual calculation of tax liabilities, dis-
posable income, and consumption takes place under the proposed policy regime.
These simulations can be used to better inform policy makers on the stabilization
impact of proposed tax reforms.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
A.1 Tables
Table A.1: Wealth Shares
2009 2010 2011 Mean
Native High Skill 0.873 0.868 0.863 0.867
Native Low Skill 0.038 0.036 0.034 0.036
Immigrant High Skill 0.078 0.085 0.091 0.085
Immigrant Low Skill 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
Notes : Constructed using data from the 2008 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation. 2009 data extracted
from the Topical Module in Wave 4, 2010 data from Wave 7 and 2011 data from Wave 10. Measure of wealth is the variable
THHTNW, a household level variable defined as the sum of all assets less unsecured debt. Assets include home equity,
net equity in vehicles, real estate equity, business equity, interest earning assets, equity in stock and mutual funds, and
retirement accounts, such as IRA, KEOGH and 401(k) savings accounts. Debt includes credit card balances and amount
owing on vehicles. Immigrants are defined as those not born in the United States which is denoted by the variable EBORNUS
in the core module of each wave. High skill level is defined by those with a bachelors degree and above, as denoted in the
EEDUCATE variable in the core module of each wave. Rows may not sum to one due to rounding.
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Table A.2: Parameterization Results
Parameter Data Source
Normalization
κL = 1, bHN = bLN = 0 Normalization
 = 0.5, η = 0.5 Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001), Hosios (1990)
ρ = 0.5 Katz and Murphy (1992), Ottaviano and Peri (2012)
α = 0.33 Standard Value
Direct Match
β = 0.9884
4.76% annual risk free rate, Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014)
δ = 0.0182 0.0061 monthly rate, Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014)
QHN = 0.261, QLN = 0.570 Average labor force shares (2005 - 2015), Current Population Survey
QHI = 0.051, QLI = 0.119
aHN (0) = 0.867, aLN (0) = 0.036 Waves 4, 7 and 10 of the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program
ParticipationaHI (0) = 0.085, aLI (0) = 0.012
Method of Moments
sHN = 0.0095, sHI = 0.0127 Unemployment rates:
sLN = 0.0233, sLI = 0.0216 uHN = 0.034, uHI = 0.045, uLN = 0.087, uLI = 0.081
ξ = 0.3629, κL = 0.2571 Wage premiums:
bHI = −0.3222, bLI = −0.5302 wHIwHN = 0.9618,
wLN
wHN
= 0.651, wLIwHN = 0.588
γ = 0.4781 Job finding rates:
fH = 0.2329, fL = 0.213
Notes : Parameter A is normalized to set steady state output equal to one. A time period is one quarter. High-
skilled workers in the CPS data are defined as those with at least a college education (educ99>14). Immigrants
are defined as those workers born outside of the United States (bpl=9900). Sample is restricted to workers
aged over 16 years who are in the labor force. See Table A.1 for description of SIPP variables.
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Table A.3: Basic Model
Low Skill Immigration High Skill Immigration
Open Closed Open Closed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Long-Run Labor Market
Native High Skill Wage (wHN ) 0 0
Native Low Skill Wage (wLN ) 0 0
Native High Skill Unemployment (uHN ) 0 0
Native Low Skill Unemployment (uLN ) 0 0
High Skill Good Price (pH) 0 0
Low Skill Good Price (pL) 0 0
Present Value Earnings
Native High Skill Labor Income 0 -0.14 0 -0.14
Native Low Skill Labor Income 0 -0.14 0 -0.14
Welfare
Native High Skill Long Run Welfare Gain (λ∗HN ) 0 0.24 0 0.24
- Transition Cost -0 -0.24 -0 -0.24
Native High Skill Welfare Gain (λHN ) 0 6 × 10−4 0 6 × 10−4
Native Low Skill Long Run Welfare Gain (λ∗LN ) 0 0.24 0 0.24
- Transition Cost -0 -0.24 -0 -0.24
Native Low Skill Welfare Gain (λLN ) 0 6 × 10−4 0 6 × 10−4
Notes : Model simulation showing the effects of a 1% immigration-induced increase in the labor force in an economy
with homogeneous labor (ρ = 1, si j = s, bi j = 0), homogeneous production (κH = κL, γ = 0.5) and per capita wealth
holdings (ai j/Qi j = a/Q). Each entry corresponds to the percentage change in that row’s variable under the assumption
of that column. The percentage changes are in response to an influx of immigrants that increases the total labor force by
1%. Columns 1 and 2 represent the case where all new immigrants are low-skilled. Columns 3 and 4 represent the case
where all new immigrants are high-skilled. Capital is assumed to flow freely from abroad in order to keep the return on
capital constant in columns 1 and 3. In columns 2 and 4, the aggregate capital stock is fully determined by domestic wealth
accumulation. The “Long-run” effects are the resulting percentage changes once the long run steady state is achieved.
The compensating differential under “On Impact” are the percentage changes in the period in which the influx of new
immigrants occur, which therefore accounts for the transition costs.
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Table A.4: Capital Surplus Channel
Low Skill Immigration High Skill Immigration
Open Closed Open Closed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Long-Run Labor Market
Native High Skill Wage (wHN ) 0 0
Native Low Skill Wage (wLN ) 0 0
Native High Skill Unemployment (uHN ) 0 0
Native Low Skill Unemployment (uLN ) 0 0
High Skill Good Price (pH) 0 0
Low Skill Good Price (pL) 0 0
Present Value Earnings
Native High Skill Labor Income 0 -0.14 0 -0.14
Native Low Skill Labor Income 0 -0.14 0 -0.14
Welfare
Native High Skill Long Run Welfare Gain (λ∗HN ) 0 0.41 0 0.41
- Transition Cost -0 -0.24 -0 -0.24
Native High Skill Welfare Gain (λHN ) 0 0.17 0 0.17
Native Low Skill Long Run Welfare Gain (λ∗LN ) 0 0.11 0 0.11
- Transition Cost -0 -0.24 -0 -0.24
Native Low Skill Welfare Gain (λLN ) 0 -0.13 0 -0.13
Notes : Model simulation showing the effects of a 1% immigration-induced increase in the labor force in an economy with
homogeneous labor (ρ = 1, si j = s, bi j = 0), homogeneous production (κH = κL, γ = 0.5) and calibrated per capita wealth
holdings (ai j/Qi j). Each entry corresponds to the elasticity of that row’s variable with respect to immigration under the
assumption of that column. Columns 1 and 2 represent the case where all new immigrants are low-skilled. Columns 3 and
4 represent the case where all new immigrants are high-skilled. Capital is assumed to flow freely from abroad in order to
keep the return on capital constant in columns 1 and 3. In columns 2 and 4, the aggregate capital stock is fully determined
by domestic wealth accumulation.
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Table A.5: Price Channel
Low Skill Immigration High Skill Immigration
Open Closed Open Closed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Long-Run Labor Market
Native High Skill Wage (wHN ) 0.44 -0.96
Native Low Skill Wage (wLN ) -0.30 0.66
Native High Skill Unemployment (uHN ) -0.22 0.48
Native Low Skill Unemployment (uLN ) 0.15 -0.33
High Skill Good Price (pH) 0.43 -0.93
Low Skill Good Price (pL) -0.18 0.40
Present Value Earnings
Native High Skill Labor Income 0.43 0.31 -0.95 -1.12
Native Low Skill Labor Income -0.29 -0.41 0.66 0.48
Welfare
Native High Skill Long Run Welfare Gain (λ∗HN ) 0.36 0.55 -0.79 -0.53
- Transition Cost -0 -0.21 -0 -0.29
Native High Skill Welfare Gain (λHN ) 0.36 0.34 -0.79 -0.82
Native Low Skill Long Run Welfare Gain (λ∗LN ) -0.23 -0.01 0.51 0.83
- Transition Cost -0 -0.21 -0 -0.29
Native Low Skill Welfare Gain (λLN ) -0.23 -0.21 0.51 0.53
Notes : Model simulation showing the effects of a 1% immigration-induced increase in the labor force in an economy
with imperfect substitution between high and low skilled goods (ρ = 0.5 < 1), homogeneous workers (si j = s, bi j = 0),
homogeneous production (κH = κL, γ = 0.5) and homogeneous wealth holdings (ai j/Qi j = a/Q). Each entry corresponds
to the elasticity of that row’s variable with respect to immigration under the assumption of that column. Columns 1 and 2
represent the case where all new immigrants are low-skilled. Columns 3 and 4 represent the case where all new immigrants
are high-skilled. Capital is assumed to flow freely from abroad in order to keep the return on capital constant in columns
1 and 3. In columns 2 and 4, the aggregate capital stock is fully determined by domestic wealth accumulation.
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Table A.6: Hiring Cost Channel
Low Skill Immigration High Skill Immigration
Open Closed Open Closed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Long-Run Labor Market
Native High Skill Wage (wHN ) 0 0.04
Native Low Skill Wage (wLN ) 0.04 0
Native High Skill Unemployment (uHN ) 0 -0.59
Native Low Skill Unemployment (uLN ) -0.37 0
High Skill Good Price (pH) 0 0
Low Skill Good Price (pL) 0 0
Present Value Earnings
Native High Skill Labor Income 0 -0.15 0.24 0.09
Native Low Skill Labor Income 0.17 0.02 0 -0.15
Welfare
Native High Skill Long Run Welfare Gain (λ∗HN ) 0 0.18 0.14 0.39
- Transition Cost -0 -0.21 -0 -0.25
Native High Skill Welfare Gain (λHN ) 0 -0.05 0.14 0.14
Native Low Skill Long Run Welfare Gain (λ∗LN ) 0.08 0.32 0 0.20
- Transition Cost -0 -0.21 -0 -0.25
Native Low Skill Welfare Gain (λLN ) 0.08 0.09 0 -0.04
Notes : Model simulation showing the effects of a 1% immigration-induced increase in the labor force in an economy with
perfect substitution between high and low skilled goods (ρ = 1), heterogeneous workers (si j, bi j), homogeneous production
(γ = 0.5) and homogeneous wealth holdings (ai j/Qi j = a/Q). Each entry corresponds to the elasticity of that row’s variable
with respect to immigration under the assumption of that column. Columns 1 and 2 represent the case where all new
immigrants are low-skilled. Columns 3 and 4 represent the case where all new immigrants are high-skilled. Capital is
assumed to flow freely from abroad in order to keep the return on capital constant in columns 1 and 3. In columns 2 and
4, the aggregate capital stock is fully determined by domestic wealth accumulation.
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Table A.7: Main Quantitative Results
Low Skill Immigration High Skill Immigration
Open Closed Open Closed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Long-Run Labor Market
Native High Skill Wage (wHN ) 0.45 -0.91
Native Low Skill Wage (wLN ) -0.27 0.67
Native High Skill Unemployment (uHN ) -0.21 -0.04
Native Low Skill Unemployment (uLN ) -0.30 -0.29
High Skill Good Price (pH) 0.43 -0.91
Low Skill Good Price (pL) -0.19 0.40
Present Value Earnings
Native High Skill Labor Income 0.45 0.31 -0.74 -0.92
Native Low Skill Labor Income -0.12 -0.25 0.69 0.50
Welfare
Native High Skill Long Run Welfare Gain (λ∗HN ) 0.17 0.51 -0.55 -0.08
- Transition Cost -0 -0.21 -0 -0.30
Native High Skill Welfare Gain (λHN ) 0.17 0.30 -0.55 -0.38
Native Low Skill Long Run Welfare Gain (λ∗LN ) -0.12 -0.03 0.67 0.80
- Transition Cost -0 -0.21 -0 -0.30
Native Low Skill Welfare Gain (λLN ) -0.12 -0.24 0.67 0.50
Notes : Model simulation showing the effects of a 1% immigration-induced increase in the labor force for the calibrated
economy. Each entry corresponds to the elasticity of that row’s variable with respect to immigration under the assumption
of that column. Columns 1 and 2 represent the case where all new immigrants are low-skilled. Columns 3 and 4 represent
the case where all new immigrants are high-skilled. Capital is assumed to flow freely from abroad in order to keep the
return on capital constant in columns 1 and 3. In columns 2 and 4, the aggregate capital stock is fully determined by
domestic wealth accumulation.
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A.2 Figures
Figure A.1: Labor Force Shares
Notes: Own illustration using data from the January 2005 to December 2014 publicly available monthly samples from the
Current Population Survey provided by IPUMS. High-skilled workers are defined as those with at least a college education
(educ99 >= 15). Immigrants are defined as those workers born outside of the United States (bpl , 9900).
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Figure A.2: Nominal Hourly Wage (LHS) and Hourly Wage as proportion
of Native High Skilled Wage (RHS)
Notes: Own illustration using data from the outgoing rotation group of each monthly sample in the Current Population
Survey between January 2005 to December 2014. Data provided by IPUMS. High-skilled workers are defined as those
with at least a college education (educ99 >= 15). Immigrants are defined as those workers born outside of the United
States (bpl , 9900). Variable used is hourly wage.
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Figure A.3: Unemployment Rates
Notes: Own illustration using data from the January 2005 to December 2014 publicly available monthly samples from the
Current Population Survey provided by IPUMS. High-skilled workers are defined as those with at least a college education
(educ99 >= 15). Immigrants are defined as those workers born outside of the United States (bpl , 9900). To be included
within the counts, a worker must be classified as within the labor force.
.
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Figure A.4: Monthly Job Finding Probabilities
Notes: Own illustration using matched data from the January 2005 to December 2014 publicly available monthly samples
from the Current Population Survey provided by IPUMS. High-skilled workers are defined as those with at least a college
education (educ99 >= 15). Missing observations are assumed to be missing at random.
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Figure A.5: Basic Model
Notes: Own illustration showing the labor market transition dynamics from immigration with homogeneous labor, perfect
intermediate good substitution. Simulation from an experiment in which the stock of high-skill immigrants increases by
1% of the total labor force at time 0. Calibration is a special case in which high and low skill goods are perfect substitutes
(ρ = 1), and all workers are homogeneous so that worker separation rates (si j = s), outside options (bi j = 0). Solid blue
lines represent the behavior of variables in an economy where capital is determined solely by the capital accumulation
decisions of resident household. Red dashed lines represent an economy open to foreign capital flows.
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Figure A.6: Price Channel
Notes: Own illustration showing the labor market transition dynamics from a 1% low-skill immigration-induced increase
in the labor force in an economy with imperfect substitution between high and low skilled goods (ρ = 0.5 < 1), homoge-
neous workers (si j = s, bi j = 0) and homogeneous production (κH = κL, γ = 0.5). Simulation from an experiment in which
the stock of high-skill immigrants increases by 1% of the labor force. Solid blue lines represent the behavior of variables in
an economy where capital is determined solely by the capital accumulation decisions of resident household. Red dashed
lines represent an economy open to foreign capital flows.
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Figure A.7: Hiring Cost Channel
Notes: Own illustration showing the labor market transition dynamics from a 1% low-skill immigration-induced increase
in the labor force in an economy with perfect substitution between high and low skilled goods (ρ = 1), heterogeneous
workers (si j, bi j) and homogeneous production (γ = 0.5). Simulation from an experiment in which the stock of low-skill
immigrants is increased by 1% of the labor force. Solid blue lines represent the behavior of variables in an economy where
capital is determined solely by the capital accumulation decisions of resident household. Red dashed lines represent an
economy open to foreign capital flows.
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Figure A.8: Calibrated Model
Notes: Own illustration showing the labor market transition dynamics from a 1% low-skill immigration-induced increase
in the United States labor force. Simulation from an experiment in which the stock of low-skill immigrants is increased
by 1% of the labor force. Calibration is described in section 1.3. Solid blue lines represent the behavior of variables in an
economy where capital is determined solely by the capital accumulation decisions of resident household. Red dashed lines
represent an economy open to foreign capital flows.
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A.3 Description of Moment Matching Calibration Procedure
The task of the procedure is to find values of the nine parameters in Θ2 =
{biN , si j, γ, κL, ξ} in order to match nine moments. The set of moments are three ra-
tios of the wages of each worker type with respect to the wage of the high skilled
native worker ( wi jwHN ), four unemployment rates (one for each type of worker, ui j),
and two job finding rates (one for each labor market, fi). The data sources for each
moment are discussed in section 1.3.
For given values of the parameters in Θ2 and the externally calibrated param-
eters in Θ1, one can sequentially calculate the following steady state values. The
targeted unemployment rates can be used to calculate the stocks of employed and
unemployed workers according to the following equations.
Ui j = Qi j · ui j
Ei j = Qi j · (1 − ui j)
Production stocks and the resulting prices of intermediate goods follow di-
rectly according to
Yi = EiN + EiI
Z =
(
γYρL + (1 − γ)YρH
)1/ρ
K = α
Y
r
pL = AKα(1 − α)γYρ−1L
[
γYρL + (1 − γ)YρH
](1−α−ρ)/ρ
pH = AKα(1 − α)(1 − γ)Yρ−1H
[
γYρL + (1 − γ)YρH
](1−α−ρ)/ρ
Using the targeted job finding probabilities, the firm value functions and the
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resulting wages can be calculated according to the following equations.
Ji j =
(1 − η)(pi − bi j)
1 − β(1 − si j − η fi)
wi j = η
(
pi + q fiJi j
)
+ (1 − η)bi j
Finally, one can calculate the implied vacancy filling probabilities by
θi =
(
fi
ξ
)1/(1−)
µi = fi/θi
The preceding equations yield values which allow me to confirm whether the
following nine equations are satisfied.
si jEi j = fiUi j for i j ∈ {HN,HI, LN, LI} (A.1)
wi j =
(
wi j
wHN
)
wHN for i j ∈ {HI, LN, LI} (A.2)
κi = βµi (φiJiI + (1 − φi)JiN) for i ∈ {H, L} (A.3)
I choose values of the parameters in Θ2 in order to satisfy equations (A.1)-(A.3).
Because the matching procedure can be reduced to a set of nine simultaneous
equations in nine unknowns, the system is perfectly identified and each moment
can be matched exactly. The results and moments of this procedure are summa-
rized in Table A.2.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
B.1 Figures
Figure B.1: Lorenz Curve Comparisons
B.2 Derivation of Equations (2.8) - (2.9)
Equation (2.7) implies that
(1 − θ)piWM = WA(1 − θpi) (B.1)
(1 − ϕ)piWM = WA(1 − ϕpi) (B.2)
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after substituting in the values of each of the search strategies Vi. These can be
rearranged to yield
1
pi
= (1 − θ)WM
WA
+ θ (B.3)
1
pi
= (1 − ϕ)WM
WT
+ ϕ (B.4)
Equating the right hand sides of (B.3) and (B.4) yields
(1 − θ)WM
WA
+ θ = (1 − ϕ)WM
WT
+ ϕ
which can be rearranged to yield Equation (2.8) after substituting in for WT = QTLT .
The definition of pi in Equation (2.1) can be rearranged to yield
pi(LI + θLII + ϕLIII) = EM
⇒pi( U
1 − pi + θ
LA
1 − θpi + ϕ
LT
1 − ϕpi ) = EM [by (2.2)-(2.5)]
⇒pi(L − LA − LT − EM
1 − pi + θ
LA
1 − θpi + ϕ
LT
1 − ϕpi ) = EM [by (2.6)]
⇒ pi
1 − pi (L − EM −
WA
WMpi
LA − WTWMpiLT ) = EM [by (B.1) and (B.2)]
⇒LA = WMpiWA L −
QT
WA
− WM
WA
EM
⇒LA = WMWA
1
(1 − θ)WMWA + θ
L − QT
WA
− WM
WA
EM [by (B.3)]
⇒LA = L
1 − θ(1 − WAWM )
− EMWM
WA
− QT
WA
which is (2.9).
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
C.1 Tables
Table C.1: Average Effective Tax Rates (1995 - 2007)
Labor Tax (τL) Capital Tax (τK)
EU - 14 41 33
Germany 41 23
France 46 35
Italy 47 34
United Kingdom 28 46
Austria 50 24
Belgium 49 42
Denmark 47 51
Finland 49 31
Greece 41 16
Ireland 27 21
Netherlands 44 29
Portugal 31 23
Spain 36 30
Sweden 56 41
Notes : Tax rates are from Table 3 in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), who calculated average effective tax rates from 1995 to
2007 using the methodology of Mendoza et al. (1994), and data from the AMECO database of the European Commission
and the OECD database.
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C.2 Figures
Figure C.1: EU-14 Labor Tax Laffer Curve
Notes: Own illustration. Simulation from model. Shows variations in total government tax revenue caused by changes
in the labor tax rate, holding constant all parameter values and the capital tax rate at τK = 33%. Total tax revenues at the
average labor tax rate of τL = 41% are normalized to 100 and indicated by the solid vertical line. For comparison, results are
provided for different labor supply elasticities (solid vs dashed lines) and for different assumptions regarding the mobility
of labor (red vs black lines).
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Figure C.2: EU-14 Capital Tax Laffer Curve
Notes: Own illustration. Simulation from model. Shows variations in total government tax revenue caused by changes
in the capital tax rate, holding constant all parameter values and the labor tax rate at τL = 41%. Total tax revenues at
the average capital tax rate of τK = 33% are normalized to 100 and indicated by the solid vertical line. For comparison,
results are provided for different labor supply elasticities (solid vs dashed lines) and for different assumptions regarding
the mobility of labor (red vs black lines).
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C.3 Derivation of Equations (3.11) and (3.12)
Hours worked are found by substituting the wage condition (3.1) into (3.5).
l = (1 − α) 1+(1−χ(1−α)) (1 − τL) 1+(1−χ(1−α))K
αχ
1+(1−χ(1−α))N
(χ(1−α)−1)
1+(1−χ(1−α))
Substituting this expression back into the marginal product conditions in (3.1)
yields the following expressions for wage and return on capital
w = (1 − α) 11+(1−χ(1−α)) (1 − τL)
(χ(1−α)−1)
1+(1−χ(1−α))K
αχ
1+(1−χ(1−α))N
χ(1−α)−1
1+(1−χ(1−α)) (C.3.1)
r = α(1 − α) χ(1−α)1+(1−χ(1−α)) (1 − τL)
χ(1−α)
1+(1−χ(1−α))K
−(1−αχ+(1−χ))
1+(1−χ(1−α)) N
χ(1−α)
1+(1−χ(1−α)) (C.3.2)
The free mobility of capital condition (3.4) along with (C.3.2) can be used to derive
an explicit equation for the capital stock in terms of the working population and
tax rates
K =
[
α(1 − τK)
r¯
] 1+(1−χ(1−α))
1−χα+(1−χ)
[(1 − α)χ(1−α)(1 − τL)χ(1−α)Nχ(1−α)] 11−χα+(1−χ) (C.3.3)
Recognizing that post tax wages can be written
(1 − τL)w = (1 − α) 11+(1−χ(1−α)) (1 − τL) 11+(1−χ(1−α))K
αχ
1+(1−χ(1−α))N
χ(1−α)−1
1+(1−χ(1−α))
implies that the free migration condition (3.7) can be expressed as follows
1 =
(
1 − τL
1 − τL∗
) 1
1+(1−χ(1−α)) ( K
K∗
) αχ
1+(1−χ(1−α)) ( N
N∗
) χ(1−α)−1
1+(1−χ(1−α))
which can be rearranged after recognizing that N∗ = N¯ − N and substituting in
(C.3.3) to yield an explicit expression for population
N = N¯
(1 − τL∗1 − τL
) 1−χα
1−χ (1 − τK∗
1 − τK
) αχ
1−χ
+ 1

−1
(C.3.4)
116
The static estimates for the change in government revenue caused by a change in
a particular tax rate are equal to the tax base of that tax, and can be written as
follows
∂R
∂τL
∣∣∣∣∣∣
static
= wL = (1 − α)(1 − α) χ(1−α)1+(1−χ(1−α)) (1 − τL)
χ(1−α)
1+(1−χ(1−α))K
αχ(1+)
1+(1−χ(1−α))N
χ(1−α)
1+(1−χ(1−α))
∂R
∂τK
∣∣∣∣∣∣
static
= rK = α(1 − α) χ(1−α)1+(1−χ(1−α)) (1 − τL)
χ(1−α)
1+(1−χ(1−α))K
αχ(1+)
1+(1−χ(1−α))N
χ(1−α)
1+(1−χ(1−α))
Substituting these expressions into (3.8) allows total government revenue to be
expressed as follows
R = (1 − α) χ(1−α)1+(1−χ(1−α)) (1 − τL)
χ(1−α)
1+(1−χ(1−α))K
αχ(1+)
1+(1−χ(1−α))N
χ(1−α)
1+(1−χ(1−α)) (ατK + (1 − α)τL) (C.3.5)
from which we can derive the following general expressions
∂R
∂τK
=
1
α
∂R
∂τK
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Static
×
[
α +
(ατK + (1 − α)τL)χ
1 + (1 − χ(1 − α))
(
α(1 + )
K
∂K
∂τK
+
(1 − α)
N
∂N
∂τK
)]
(C.3.6)
∂R
∂τL
=
∂R
∂τL
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Static
×
[
1 +
(ατK + (1 − α)τL)χ
(1 + (1 − χ(1 − α)))(1 − α)
(
α(1 + )
K
∂K
∂τL
+
(1 − α)
N
∂N
∂τL
− (1 − α)
1 − τL
)]
(C.3.7)
Taking derivatives of (C.3.4) reveals the effect of tax changes on population
∂N
∂τK
= −NN∗
N¯
χα
1 − χ
1
1 − τK (C.3.8)
∂N
∂τL
= −NN∗
N¯
1 − χα
1 − χ
1
1 − τL (C.3.9)
and derivatives of (C.3.3) reveals the same for capital stock
∂K
∂τK
= − K
(1 − χα + (1 − χ))(1 − τK)
[
1 + (1 − χ(1 − α)) + χ
2α(1 − α)
1 − χ
N∗
N¯
]
(C.3.10)
∂K
∂τL
= − Kχ(1 − α)
(1 − χα + (1 − χ))(1 − τL)
[
 +
1 − χα
1 − χ
N∗
N¯
]
(C.3.11)
The “closed” economy cases in which migration is restricted are found by setting
N∗ = 0. Substituting the appropriate versions of (C.3.8) - (C.3.11) into (C.3.6) and
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(C.3.7) yields the required expressions.
∂R
∂τL
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dynamic
=
[
1 − χ(ατK + (1 − α)τL)
(1 − χα + (1 − χ))(1 − τL)
(
 +
1 − χα
1 − χ
N∗
N¯
)]
× ∂R
∂τL
∣∣∣∣
Static
∂R
∂τK
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dynamic
=
[
1 − χ(ατK + (1 − α)τL)
(1 − χα + (1 − χ))(1 − τK)
(
1 +  +
(1 − α)χ
1 − χ
N∗
N¯
)]
× ∂R
∂τK
∣∣∣∣
Static
C.4 Propositions
Proposition 4. Consider the following Cobb Douglas production function
Y =
(
KαL1−α
)χ
If χ = 1 and K and L are mobile and determined by their own independent marginal
product conditions, no unique solution for K and L exists.
Proof. Let the marginal productivity conditions be as follows
∂Y
∂K
= αχKαχ−1Lχ(1−α) = A
∂Y
∂L
= (1 − α)χKαχLχ(1−α)−1 = B
Taking logs and rearranging yields the following system of linear equations
αχ − 1 χ(1 − α)αχ χ(1 − α) − 1

log(K)log(L)
 =
 log
(
A
αχ
)
log
(
B
(1−α)χ
)

which has a unique solution if and only if
χ , 1
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The intuition behind this result is that when production has constant returns
to scale, each marginal productivity condition merely pins down the ratio of cap-
ital to labor rather than the levels of each. The system of equations reduces to two
equations in one unknown and therefore becomes over identified.
Proposition 5. Provided that a Laffer Curve has an interior peak, that peak shifts to the
left as the labor supply elasticity increases and in the presence of international migration.
Proof. Setting ∂R
∂τK
|Dynamic = 0 and ∂R∂τL |Dynamic = 0 yields the following expressions
for the interior peaks of each Laffer Curve.
τ∗L =
1 − χα + (1 − χ) − αχ
(
 + 1−χα1−χ
N∗
N¯
)
τK
1 − χα + (1 − χ) + (1 − α)χ
(
 + 1−χα1−χ
N∗
N¯
)
τ∗K =
1 − χα + (1 − χ) − (1 − α)χ
(
1 +  + 1−α1−χχ
N∗
N¯
)
τL
1 − χα + (1 − χ) + αχ
(
1 +  + 1−α1−χχ
N∗
N¯
)
It follows that
∂τ∗K
∂
< 0 ,
∂τ∗K
∂(N∗/N)
< 0 ,
∂τ∗L
∂
< 0 ,
∂τ∗L
∂(N∗/N)
< 0
as required. 
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C.5 Individual Country Labor Tax Laffer Curves
The following figures provide the same information as Figure C.1 for each of the
individual European countries.
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C.6 Individual Country Capital Tax Laffer Curves
The following figures provide the same information as Figure C.2 for each of the
individual European countries.
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APPENDIX D
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
D.1 Tables and Figures
Figure D.1: Percentage of Tax Filers Itemizing Deductions (left) and
Claiming the Mortgage Interest Deduction (right) by Income
Notes: Own illustration using data from the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income Tax Stats on Individual Tax
Returns. The panels report the averages in the given income bracket from 1980 to 2012 (adjusted to 2012 dollars) with
confidence bars indicating +/- one standard deviation.
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Figure D.2: Total Yearly Tax Filers Claiming the Charitable Contributions
Deduction and Total Eligible Charity Spending (left) and Ag-
gregate Charitable Giving by Income (right)
Notes: Own illustration using data from the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income Tax Stats on Individual Tax
Returns (left). Own illustration using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (right). The points in the right hand
panel indicate the average aggregate giving in the given income bracket from 1988 to 2009 (adjusted to 2012 dollars) with
confidence bars indicating +/- one standard deviation.
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Figure D.3: Percentage of U.S. Population Identified as Hand-to-Mouth
(HtM) and Median Income of HtM Households Over Time
Notes: Own illustration using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 1988 to 2009. The median income has been
adjusted by CPI to 2012 dollars.
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Figure D.4: Normalized Tax Change Shifter (NTCS) (left) and MPC Ad-
justed NTCS (ANTCS) (right) for the Mortgage Interest De-
duction (MID) and the Charitable Contributions Deduction
(CCD)
Notes: Own illustration using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 1988 to 2009. Each line represents the change
in the stabilizing effect of the tax system that would have occurred without the particular tax provision as indicated in the
legend. The NTCS measures the destabilizing effect of a tax expenditure on disposable income, which we show can be
interpreted as (1) the extra proportion of a fluctuation in market income that would be absorbed by the tax system in the
absence of tax provision, (2) the sensitivity of the tax expenditure to income changes, or (3) the sensitivity of the effective
marginal tax rates to the tax expenditure, where we estimate the change with respect to the hypothetical elimination of a
tax expenditure rather than a marginal ($1) change in income commonly used throughout the empirical macroeconomics
literature. The ANTCS for each tax expenditure estimates the extra amount of consumption, as a proportion of a fluctuation
in market income, that the tax system would have absorbed in the absence of the tax provision.
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Figure D.5: The Increase in Sensitivity of Consumption to Income Fluctu-
ations Induced by the Mortgage Interest Deduction (MID) and
the Charitable Contributions Deduction (CCD)
Notes: Own illustration using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 1988 to 2009.
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Table D.1: Yearly and Average Estimates of the Destabilizing Effects of the Mort-
gage Interest Deduction (MID) and the Charitable Contributions Deduction (CCD)
Year
Measure 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 Mean St. Dev.
NTC (%) 23.6 24.5 25.9 26.7 28.3 24.9 24.6 23.9 25.4 1.7
ANTC (%) 3.3 4.3 4.2 3.5 3.6 5.0 2.6 2.1 3.7 0.9
NTCS (basis points)
MID 42.8 34.2 47.6 49.0 48.7 52.5 68.6 76.9 50.2 13.2
CCD 25.6 22.5 34.8 37.6 43.2 45.6 44.4 58.1 38.2 12.2
ANTCS (basis points)
MID 13.6 13.2 20.3 20.8 21.8 11.6 26.8 25.9 18.2 5.4
CCD 8.6 11.4 18.1 17.7 20.3 9.5 24.1 23.0 15.5 5.6
Total Personal Income (in $2012 trillion)
8.5 8.2 8.9 9.8 11.1 11.4 12.5 12.4 10.0 1.6
Consumption Sensitivity in the Absence of the Tax System (%)
16.4 20.1 19.1 16.2 15.4 20.7 14.5 12.2 17.2 3.0
Consumption Sensitivity in the Presence of the Tax System (%)
13.1 15.8 14.9 12.8 11.8 15.8 11.8 10.0 13.5 2.2
Change in the Consumption Sensitivity Induced By the Expenditure (%)
MID 0.83 0.67 1.06 1.28 1.42 0.59 1.85 2.13 1.13 0.54
CCD 0.52 0.57 0.95 1.09 1.32 0.46 1.67 1.89 0.97 0.52
Converted to Dollars (in £2012 billions)
MID 2.1 1.6 2.8 3.8 4.7 1.9 7 7.9 3.5 2.2
CCD 1.3 1.4 2.5 3.2 4.4 1.6 6.3 7.0 3.1 2.1
Notes : Own illustration using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 1988 to 2009. Each column
represents the yearly estimated values of the row variables in the year indicated on the column headings,
and the last two columns report the average and standard deviation of these yearly estimates. The Nor-
malized Tax Change (NTC) estimates how much aggregate tax revenue changes in response to a change in
aggregate market income. The MPC Adjusted NTC (ANTC) estimates the change in aggregate taxes that
would have otherwise been spent as a proportion of the change in aggregate market income. The NTC Shifter
(NTCSX) estimates the extra proportion of a fluctuation in market income that would be absorbed by the
tax system in the absence of tax provision X. The ANTC Shifter (ANTCSX) estimates the extra amount of
consumption, as a proportion of a fluctuation in market income, that the tax system would have absorbed
in the absence of tax provision X. Total personal income is the aggregate gross income subject to the fed-
eral income tax, which was obtained from the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income Tax Stats on
Individual Tax Returns. The “Consumption Sensitivity in the Absence of the Tax System” is the estimated
income-weighted marginal propensity to consume, which can also be interpreted as the baseline response of
aggregate consumption to income fluctuations in the absence of a tax system. The “Consumption Sensitivity
in the Presence of the Tax System” is the estimated income-weighted marginal propensity to consume less
the ANTC, which can also be interpreted as the response of aggregate consumption to income fluctuations
in the presence of the tax system. The “Change in the Consumption Sensitivity Induced By the Expenditure”
estimates the extent that the tax expenditure decreased the ability of the tax system to reduce the sensitivity
of consumption with respect to market income changes, which is converted to dollar values based on a 3%
recession by multiplying the it by the change in total personal income resulting from the 3% recession.
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D.2 Identification of HtM Households
To estimate the ANTC according to Equation (4.2), we must first identify whether
each household is hand-to-mouth (HtM). Under the standard assumption that
each HtM household has an MPC = 1 while all other households have zero MPC,
the change in disposable income for these households is then interpreted as a
change in consumption. The automatic stabilization literature attempts to tackle
the problem of identifying HtM households in a number of ways. Zeldes (1989)
and Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) use a wealth to income ratio cutoff to define
HtM households. Runkle (1991) classifies those households that do not own their
own home as HtM. Jappelli et al. (1998) and Dolls et al. (2012) define a household
as HtM if (1) a credit application has been either rejected or not fully approved, or
(2) a credit application has not been submitted because of the fear of rejection. The
main drawback of these approaches stems from the fact that they fail to capture
the many wealthy households that have been widely identified in the literature as
HtM (Campbell and Hercowitz, 2009; Broda and Parker, 2014; Hsieh, 2003; Agar-
wal et al., 2007; Misra and Surico, 2014; Telyukova, 2013; Browning and Collado,
2001; Browning and Crossley, 2001).
Kingi and Rozema (2015) point out that, within the context of estimating au-
tomatic stabilizers, the approach to identify HtM households in Kaplan and Vi-
olante (2014) (KV) overcomes this limitation. KV explain wealthy household HtM
behavior by showing that many of these households choose to hold their wealth
in the form of high return illiquid assets. These wealthy households choose to
consume a large proportion of income fluctuations in order to avoid the costs as-
sociated with liquidating illiquid assets. KV define a household to be HtM if it
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either has zero liquid wealth or is at its credit limit. More formally, household i is
HtM if either
0 ≤ mi ≤ yi2 fi
or
mi ≤ 0 and mi ≤ yi2 fi − mi
where mi is the average balance of liquid assets over the past month, yi is monthly
labor income, mi is the credit limit, and fi is the pay period frequency. Liquid
wealth includes cash, money market, checking, savings and call accounts. The
SCF does not record household cash holdings, so KV identify revolving debt and
impute cash holdings. For identifying revolving unsecured debt, KV follow the
common strategy of excluding from debt the purchases made through credit cards
between regular payments (Telyukova, 2013). In particular, they use direct evi-
dence from the SCF that asks about credit card balances, including: (1) “How of-
ten do you pay your credit card balance in full?”, where possible answers include:
(a) Always or almost always; (b) Sometimes; or (c) Almost never, and (2) “After
the last payment, roughly what was the balance still owed on these accounts?”
KV identify households with revolving debt as those households that respond to
the first question with (b) or (c), and for these households then compute statistics
about credit card debt using the answer to the second question. To impute cash
holdings, KV make use of previous estimates of median household cash holdings
(Foster et al., 2011), and adjust for cash holdings by increasing the median wealth
in checking, saving, money market, and call accounts as measured in the SCF by
this amount.
The two separate HtM conditions in the KV approach capture how households
with sufficiently low liquid assets with respect to their monthly income behave as
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HtM. Both conditions are important in defining HtM households because house-
holds at kinks of their budget constraint have a high MPC out of a windfall gain in
income, regardless of how they got there. The distinguishing factor between the
KV approach and the Jappelli et al. (1998) approach is that the former can account
not only for households living at their credit limit, but also for wealthy house-
holds who hold no liquid wealth. A more detailed discussion of this intuition and
identification of these HtM households using the SCF can be found in Appendix
B of KV. A complete discussion of how KV’s HtM definition impacts the estima-
tion of automatic stabilizers and, more generally, is important for the design of the
microsimulation techniques used in the estimation of automatic stabilizers can be
found in Kingi and Rozema (2015).
D.3 Accounting for Multiple Imputation
The SCF focuses on sensitive household information, and therefore nonresponse
rates are nontrivial. Furthermore, the relatively common occurrence of unusual
observations in the general population threaten the anonymity of many survey
respondents. Since the comprehensive redesign of the survey in 1989, a multi-
ple imputation procedure has been adopted to overcome these issues by replac-
ing missing and sensitive values with five alternative values (Kennickell, 1998).
These alternative values are drawn repeatedly from an estimate of the conditional
distribution of the data, which is modeled using the Federal Reserve Imputation
Technique Zeta model. The imputations are stored as five successive “implicates”
of each household, so that the number of observations in the full data set (22,610
in 2004, for example) is five times the actual number of respondents.
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The multiple imputation procedure has implications for the estimation of
statistics. A point estimate, for example, is given by the mean of the estimates
derived independently from each of the five separate implicates. The calculation
of an appropriate estimate of variance is slightly more involved, because the mul-
tiple imputations add extra variability to the data. The best estimate of variance
is the average of the variance estimates derived independently from each of the
five implicates (“within” imputation variance), plus an estimate of the “between”
imputation variance, with an adjustment factor for using a finite number of im-
putations. A detailed description of the procedure, along with computer code, is
provided in the “Imputation” section of the 2004 SCF codebook.
We now describe how we estimate the results, adjusting for multiple impu-
tation. Consider the right hand side panel of Figure D.2, which presents point
estimates and standard deviation bands for the average total dollar amount of
aggregate annual charitable giving from 1988 to 2009, broken down by income
brackets. In order to calculate the point estimates, we first do so independently
for each separate implicate. Let the point estimate and standard deviation for the
average amount of aggregate annual charitable giving across the 1988 to 2009 pe-
riod for implicate i be denoted by βi and si respectively. The corresponding point
estimates (β) presented in Figure D.2 are calculated by
β =
∑5
i=1 βi
5
The standard deviations (σ) are calculated as follows
σ =
√
(s¯ + 6/5 · sˆ)
where s¯ is the within imputation variation and sˆ is the between imputation variance
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given by
s¯ =
∑5
i=1 s
2
i
5
, sˆ =
∑5
i=1(β − βi)2
4
An analogue procedure is used to calculate all the SCF-derived statistics pre-
sented in this article.
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